Essays on commitment and flexibility by Payro Chew, Fernando
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Boston University Theses & Dissertations
2021





GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
Dissertation
ESSAYS ON COMMITMENT AND FLEXIBILITY
by
FERNANDO PAYRÓ CHEW
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for always believing in me.
v
ESSAYS ON COMMITMENT AND FLEXIBILITY
FERNANDO PAYRÓ CHEW
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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of two essays studying economic agents who choose
menus, or opportunity sets from which they will make a choice at a later date. The
common theme is that the utility of a menu can be affected by inclusion of alterna-
tives that are not subsequently chosen. This effect can create either a preference for
commitment or a preference for flexibility.
The first essay models an agent who experiences temptation when choosing from
a menu of lotteries, and who is self-aware and anticipates her future behavior when
choosing between menus. Her desire to eliminate tempting alternatives from a menu
creates a preference for commitment. When studying menus of lotteries, the literature
has typically assumed that preferences satisfy the Independence axiom. Independence
requires that the ranking of two menus is not affected if each is mixed (probabilisti-
cally) with a common third menu. In particular, the preference for commitment is
invariant under Independence. This essay argues that intuitive behavior may require
that the preference for commitment be affected by such mixing, and hence be mix-
ture-dependent. To capture such behavior, a generalization of the temptation and
self-control model of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) is provided. The model generalizes
Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) by replacing their Independence axiom with a suitably
adapted version of the Mixture-Betweenness axiom of Chew (1989) and Dekel (1986).
vi
The result is an implicit utility model in which utility is defined as the unique solution
of an equation that depends on the agent’s commitment and temptation rankings,
neither of which needs to satisfy the Independence axiom. Axiomatic characterization
of the model exploits a novel extension of the Mixture Space Theorem to preferences
that satisfy Mixture-Betweenness. Since the Mixture Space Theorem is central to
decision theory, this extension is potentially useful for addressing issues in economics
other than temptation and self-control.
The second essay explores the testable implications of the linear representations
considered in Dekel et al. (2001). Dekel et al. (2001) extends the seminal model of
preference for flexibility due to Kreps (1979) by considering menus of lotteries rather
than deterministic alternatives. They show that a simple set of axioms characterizes
a representation that can be interpreted as if the agent is uncertain about her future
tastes. This taste uncertainty is summarized by the “subjective state space”, consist-
ing of the set of possible future preferences over lotteries. Their approach is axiomatic,
thus testability requires that the entire preference order be observable. This essay
provides a corresponding revealed preference analysis and assumes that only finitely
many choices are observed. It is shown that for a particular class of data sets, the
characterizing conditions can be reformulated as nonlinear systems of inequalities for
which the existence of solutions can be verified using numerical methods. Hence, for
this type of data, the analysis provides a test for the subjective state space hypothesis
that is, in principle, implementable. In addition, the analysis covers the case where
available data involves only menus of alternatives (and not lotteries). Hence, it also
provides revealed preference characterizations for Kreps (1979).
vii
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A key motivation for the literature on temptation and self-control problems comes
from evidence of a preference for commitment (Bryan et al. (2010), Gul and Pe-
sendorfer (2007) and Laibson (1997)). For instance a dieter might strictly prefer to
eat at a salad bar rather than at a restaurant that offers both salad (s) and burgers
(b). Identifying a restaurant with the set of alternatives it offers, this agent therefore
exhibits
{s}  {s, b}.
In a seminal paper, Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) (henceforth GP) provide an axiomatic
model of temptation and self-control that characterizes a preference over menus (of
lotteries) in a manner that permits such preference for commitment. A distinct
feature of GP is that it maintains the Independence axiom (appropriately adapted to
the domain). We observe that Independence implies that preference for commitment
must be mixture independent in the following sense:
{s}  {s, b} =⇒ {αs+ (1− α)i}  {αs+ (1− α)i, αb+ (1− α)i},
2
where αs+ (1−α)i and αb+ (1−α)i are lotteries that yield s and b with probability
α respectively and dish i with probability (1− α).
The main motivation of this paper is the idea that preference for commitment
may in fact be mixture-dependent. To illustrate, consider a frugal vacationer who is
planning a trip and needs to choose a hotel room. During her trip, she expects to
use the room only to sleep. Hence, she strictly prefers a conventional room (c) to a
fancy room (f). The vacationer can either choose to reserve the room in advance and
commit to staying in the room she reserved, or choose the room once she arrives at
the hotel. She believes that if she waits until she arrives, she will not feel tempted to
choose f ; after all, she is very careful with her spending and will only be using the
room to sleep. Hence,
{c} ∼ {c, f}.
However, being a preferred member of the hotel, she receives a promotion: her name
will be added to a raffle where the prize is a free night in the fancy room, which we
will denote by f ′, with full reimbursements if necessary. If she waits until she arrives
at the hotel to choose a room, then she will face a choice between two lotteries:
αc+ (1−α)f ′ and αf + (1−α)f ′ where (1−α) is the probability she wins the raffle.
Since there is a possibility that she might be able to stay in the fancy room for free,
she will be dreaming about it for the rest of the day. Hence, if she waits to choose the
room until she arrives, by then she will find the fancy room tempting. Thus, in order
to avoid temptation and stick to her budget, she would rather book the conventional
room in advance:
{αc+ (1− α)f ′}  {αc+ (1− α)f ′, αf + (1− α)f ′}.
Notice that the traveler’s preference for commitment changed once the alternatives
3
in {c, f} were mixed with f ′. Therefore, her preference for commitment is mixture-
dependent.
Building on GP, we provide a novel axiomatic model of temptation and self-
control. Like GP, our model characterizes preference over menus of lotteries. The
key difference is that our model can accommodate mixture-dependent preference for
commitment; it does do so by weakening Independence to a property we refer to as
Mixture-Betweenness which adapts the Mixture-Betwenness axiom of Chew (1983)
and Dekel (1986).
More specifically, let ∆(X) be the set of all lotteries with payoffs in X. GP
consider a preference  over the set of all menus of lotteries (subsets of ∆(X)). The
interpretation is that at an unmodeled second stage, a lottery is selected from the
menu chosen ex-ante according to . GP axiomatize the following utility function
for ,





for all menus x, where u and v are vNM utility functions over lotteries. For singleton
menus, V ({p}) = u(p) and thus u describes preference under commitment, which
we interpret as describing the agent’s normative view. The function v describes the
agent’s “temptations” at the at the moment of choice. In order to resist temptation,
the agent most exercise costly self-control which is described by v(p)−max
q∈x
v(q). Since
u and v are vNM utility functions, they satisfy the standard Independence axiom.
This is imposed for reasons of analytical convenience rather than descriptive validity
in view of the widely documented descriptive violations of the Independence axiom.1
The fact that in GP’s model the normative and temptation utilities are linear
precludes their model from accommodating mixture-dependent preference for com-
1See the surveys by Camerer (1995) and Starmer (2000).
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mitment. In fact this limitation exists also in subsequent generalizations of GP in
the literature (Dekel et al. (2009), Chatterjee and Krishna (2009), Noor and Takeoka
(2010),Noor and Takeoka (2015), Stovall (2010) and Kopylov (2012)). In order to
accommodate mixture-dependent preference for commitment we need to allow for
non-linear u and v.
This motivates us to consider the Chew (1983)-Dekel (1986) model for preference
over risk. Their model is motivated by the descriptive failure of the Independence
axiom and generalizes vNM utility theory. In particular, it is an implicit utility model
in which the utility γ of a lottery p is the unique solution of
γ = u(p, γ),
where u(., γ) is a vNM utility function over lotteries for all γ. The main ingredi-
ent in the characterization of the model is the Mixture-Betweenness axiom which
is a weakening of Independence that is compatible with behavior such as the Allais
paradox.
Our model combines GP and Chew-Dekel. The result is an implicit utility model
in which the utility of a menu x is defined as the unique γ that solves
γ = max
p∈x
{u(p, γ) + v(p, γ)−max
q∈x
v(q, γ)},
where u(., γ) and v(., γ) are vNM utility functions over lotteries for all γ. Notice
that our model is inherently non-linear. Hence, standard tools cannot be used to
axiomatize it because they rely on the Mixture Space Theorem (Herstein and Milnor
(1953)) at a fundamental level. Thus, we are forced to take a different approach.
In particular, we develop a novel extension of the Mixture Space Theorem. Since
the Mixture Space Theorem is central to decision theory, our extension is potentially
useful for addressing issues in economics other than temptation. Hence, we view it
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as a separate contribution of the paper.
The paper proceeds as follows: The introduction concludes with a review of the
relevant literature. Axioms and the implied representation of utility are described
in Sections 1.2 and 1.3 respectively. Section 1.4 contains a discussion of mixture-
dependent preference for commitment as well as axiomatic foundations for two special
cases of the model. Section 1.5 concludes with our version of the Mixture Space
Theorem and a discussion of its potential applications. The proof of the new Mixture
Space Theorem is provided in Appendix A.1. The remaining proofs are collected in
Appendices A.2-A.6.
1.1.2 Literature Review
This paper contributes to the axiomatic literature on temptation and self-control
(Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), Dekel et al. (2001), and for a survey of the subsequent
literature see Lipman and Pesendorfer (2013)). The closest papers to ours are Noor
and Takeoka (2010), Noor and Takeoka (2015) and Liang et al. (2019). They also
generalize GP by weakening Independence. Noor and Takeoka (2010) and Noor and
Takeoka (2015) extend GP to a model with a convex self-control cost, a feature shared
by the non-axiomatic model of Fudenberg and Levine (2006). Liang et al. (2019)
enrich GP by endowing the agent with a stock of willpower that cannot be exceeded
by the cost of self-control in any menu.2 In both models the agent’s normative
and temptation utilities satisfy the Independence axiom thereby ruling out mixture-
dependent preference for commitment.
Dillenberger and Sadowski (2012) provide a model of shame for preferences over
menus of monetary divisions between two agents, a dictator and a recipient. Their
model adapts and extends GP, and can accommodate the following experimental
2A closely related paper, Masatlioglu et al. (2020) deals with menus of abstract alternatives rather
than menus of lotteries.
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finding: when subjects are presented with a menu of monetary divisions, they tend
to behave altruistically whenever the recipient can observe the menu from which they
are making the choice. However, at an ex-ante stage that is not observed by the
recipient, some subjects are willing to give up part of their payoff in exchange for
the removal of the altruistic monetary divisions so that in the second stage they can
choose “unfair” divisions without feeling any shame. Since the objects of choice in
their set up are menus of deterministic alternatives, their analysis is silent about
mixture-dependence.
Following Dillenberger and Sadowski (2012) and GP, Saito (2015) develops a model
of impure shame and impure altruism (that is, shame and altruism driven by temp-
tation) for preferences over menus of lotteries. His model satisfies the Independence
axiom and thus, cannot accommodate mixture-dependent preference for commitment.
Dekel et al. (2009), Chatterjee and Krishna (2009), Stovall (2010) and Kopylov
(2012) also generalize GP. Their models satisfy the Independence axiom. We believe
that our Mixture Space Theorem and the arguments used in the proof of Theorem
1.3.1 can be used to generalize these models in the same way that we generalize GP.
Finally, outside the temptation literature but within the menus of lotteries litera-
ture, Ergin and Sarver (2010) derive a utility representation of costly contemplation.
The model assumes that the agent chooses from a menu with imperfect knowledge of
her preference over lotteries. In particular, the agent considers a set of possible pref-
erences over lotteries where each of them satisfies the standard Independence axiom.
Their key axiom, referred to as Aversion to Contingent Planning, is a weakening of
our adaptation of the Mixture-Betweenness axiom.
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1.2 Axioms
Let X be a finite set of cardinality n. A lottery is a probability measure over X. The
set of all lotteries is denoted ∆(X) and X denotes the set of all of its non-empty closed
subsets. We endow X with the topology generated by the Hausdorff metric.3 A menu
is an element of X . Generic menus will be denoted by x, y and z and generic lotteries
will be denoted by p, q and r. Each lottery p can be identified with the singleton
menu {p} ∈ X . Thus, where it does not cause confusion we will abuse notation and
write p instead of {p} and ∆(X) instead of {{p}|p ∈ ∆(X)}.
Our primitive is a preference  over X . We impose four axioms on  of which
the first three are from GP.
Weak Order  is complete and transitive.
Hausdorff Continuity {y|x  y} and {y|y  x} are closed for all x ∈ X .
Set-Betweenness x  y implies x  x ∪ y  y.
Set-Betweenness admits an interpretation in terms of temptation and self-control. To
illustrate, consider the ranking {p}  {p, q}  {q}. The ranking {p}  {p, q} is
referred to as preference for commitment, it suggests that the agent expects to be
temped by q if she faces {p, q}. Thus, {p, q}  {q} implies that the agent expects to
be able to resist temptation if she faces {p, q}, but it will require costly self-control.
Similarly, {p}  {p, q} ∼ {q} suggests that the agent expects to be overwhelmed
by temptation if she faces {p, q}. Finally, the lack of preference for commitment in
{p} ∼ {p, q}  {q} suggests that the agent does not expect to be tempted by q if she
faces {p, q}.
3Let d be any metric on ∆(X). For any x, y ∈ X and p, q ∈ ∆(X), define d(p, y) ≡ inf
q∈y
d(p, y)




d(q, x)}. The topology generated by dh is the Hausdorff metric
topology.
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Whenever x ⊂ y and x  y we say  has preference for commitment at y. Under
the temptation and self-control interpretation, preference for commitment at y reveals
that there is some element in y that the agent expects to be tempted by and thus,
would like to remove from the feasible set she will face in the second stage.
For any two menus x, y and α ∈ [0, 1], define the mixture αx + (1 − α)y as the
menu generated by the point-wise mixtures:
αx+ (1− α)y = {r ∈ ∆(X)|r = αp+ (1− α)q, p ∈ x, q ∈ y}.
GP’s fourth axiom formulates the standard vNM Independence axiom in the menus
of lotteries setting.
Independence x  y implies αx + (1 − α)z  αy + (1 − α)z for all α ∈ [0, 1] and
z ∈ X .
GP, Dekel et al. (2001) and the literature that followed them adopt this axiom
because of its normative appeal and the analytical convenience it offers. To under-
stand their motivation consider an extension of the preference to the set of lotteries
over X , the interpretation being that randomization over menus is resolved before
the second stage. Suppose that this extended preference satisfies the standard vNM
Independence axiom: the preference between a lottery that yields with probability
α a menu x and with probability 1 − α a menu z (denoted by α ◦ x + (1 − α) ◦ z)
and α ◦ y + (1 − α) ◦ z is the same as the preference between x and y. If the agent
is indifferent between uncertainty being resolved before the second stage or after the
second stage, then she satisfies Reduction:
α ◦ x+ (1− α) ◦ y ∼ αx+ (1− α)y for all x, y ∈ X and α ∈ [0, 1].
Observe that vNM Independence and Reduction imply Independence. However, we
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claim that temptation may lead to violations of vNM Independence. Recall the
rankings in our example:
{c} ∼ {c, f}
{αc+ (1− α)f ′}  {αc+ (1− α)f ′, αf + (1− α)f ′}.
(1.1)
The intuition behind these rankings implies that the agent would strictly prefer α ◦
{c}+ (1−α)◦{f ′} to α◦{c, f}+ (1−α)◦{f ′} because once there is a possibility she
might be able to stay in the fancy room for free, she will think about it extensively.
Hence, if the lottery α ◦ {c, f}+ (1− α) ◦ {f ′} yields {c, f}, she will feel tempted to
choose f .
More generally, Independence implies that preference for commitment is mixture
independent: if  has preference for commitment at y, then  also has preference for
commitment at αy+ (1−α)z for all α ∈ (0, 1] and z ∈ X . This follows from the fact
that under Independence,
x  y =⇒ αx+ (1−α)z  αy + (1− α)z
and
x ⊂ y =⇒ αx+ (1−α)z ⊂ αy + (1− α)z.
Hence, Independence needs to be weakened. We weaken it to a suitable adaptation
of the Mixture-Betweenness axiom of Dekel (1986) and Chew (1989).
Mixture-Betweenness
x  y implies x  αx+ (1− α)y  y for all α ∈ (0, 1), and
x ∼ y implies x ∼ αx+ (1− α)y ∼ y for all α ∈ (0, 1).
Mixture-Betweenness requires that if an agent prefers x to y, then the mixture
between x and y has to be between these two menus in terms of preference. In
particular, if an agent is indifferent between two menus, then any mixture of these
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two is equally good. Hence, it implies that the indifference sets are convex. Next, we
consider what Mixture-Betweenness permits and what it rules out.
Mixture-Betweenness allows for Mixture-dependent preference for commitment.
For instance, the rankings in (1.1) are consistent with Mixture-Betweenness because
the latter is silent about behavior that involves more than two menus. However, it
does rule out a specific class of mixture-dependent preference for commitment. To
illustrate, consider a dieter who prefers to go to a salad bar rather than a restaurant
that offers salads (s) and burgers (b):
{s}  {s, b}  {b}. (1.2)
Suppose now that there is a small new restaurant that also offers salads and burgers,
but its burgers are so popular that it sometimes runs out of them. Therefore, its
menu offers salads and a lottery between burgers and salads. Mixture-Betweenness
would then require that the dieter would also expect to feel temptation if she goes to
the new restaurant because its menu is equal to a mixture between the salad bar and
the restaurant. In particular, it is equal to
{s, αs+ (1− α)b},
where α is the probability that the restaurant runs out of burgers. Hence,
{s}  {s, b} =⇒ {s}  {s, αs+ (1− α)b}.
In general, Mixture-Betweenness requires that if x ⊂ y and x  y, then x 
αx + (1 − α)y. Thus, it implies that if the agent has preference for commitment at
y, then the agent’s preference for commitment is mixture independent whenever the
mixture is with any subset of y that she would prefer to commit to.
Mixture-Betweenness also imposes some structure on the agent’s self-control. To
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illustrate, consider again the dieting agent. Suppose now that there are two restau-
rants that belong to the same chain and assume that one is smaller than the other.
The smaller restaurant does not have a fixed menu. Rather, its menu its picked ran-
domly by the chef (chef’s pick). It can either be a salad or a burger. The larger
restaurant not only offers the chef’s pick, but in addition it has a fixed burger se-
lection. Consistent with the preference for commitment she exhibited in (1.2), she
prefers to go to the smaller restaurant. Hence,
{αs+ (1− α)b}  {αs+ (1− α)b, b}
where α is the probability that the chef’s pick is a salad. If the dieter exerted costly
self-control in {s, b} (that is, if {s, b}  {b} in (1.2)), then since the menu at the
larger restaurant is a mixture between {s, b} and {b}, Mixture-Betweenness implies
that
{αs+ (1− α)b, b}  {b}.
Thus, if the dieter expects to resist temptation when facing {s, b}, then she must
also expect to resist temptation when facing {αs+ (1−α)b, b}. Hence, whenever her
preference for commitment is preserved in a mixture with the tempting alternative,
so is her ability to resist temptation.
As a matter of fact, Mixture-Betweenness also requires the lack of self-control to
be mixture independent for certain mixtures. For instance, suppose that the dieter
thinks she will be overwhelmed by temptation if she goes to the old restaurant that
offers salads and burgers (that is, if {s, b} ∼ {b} in (1.2)). Suppose now that she
is also considering the large chain restaurant. Since the menu at the large chain
12
restaurant is a mixture between {s, b} and {b}, Mixture-Betweenness requires that
{αs+ (1− α)b, b} ∼ {b}.
Thus, if the dieter expects to be overwhelmed by temptation when facing {s, b},
then she must also expect to be overwhelmed by temptation when facing {αs+ (1−
α)b, b}. Hence, her lack of self-control is mixture independent when mixing with the
overwhelming alternative.
We see therefore that the agent’s self-control is mixture independent in a limited
sense:
If {s}  {s, b}, then {s, b}  {b} if and only if {αs+ (1− α)b, b}  {b}.
This suggests that Mixture-Betweenness imposes a form of linearity of self control
costs. In contrast, the model of convex self-control costs of Noor and Takeoka (2010)
allows for mixture dependent self-control. In particular, their model can accommodate
behavior of the following type:
{s}  {s, b} ∼ {b}
{αs+ (1− α)b, b}  {b}.
(1.3)
The reason is that in their model, the marginal cost of self-control is increasing in
the exertion of self-control. Hence, achieving “small” deviations from the tempting
alternative is easier than large deviations. In terms of the rankings in (1.3), their
model permits the dieter to believe that she will be able to choose αs + (1 − α)b
in the presence of b even if she expects to choose b from {s, b} for a small enough
α. Therefore Mixture-Betweenness rules out convex self-control costs. Similarly,
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Mixture-Betweenness also rules out behavior related to concave self-control costs:
{s} ∼ {s, b}  {b}
{s}  {s, αs+ (1− α)b}.
1.3 Results
1.3.1 Representation Theorem
Say that  is non-trivial if there exists x, y ∈ X such that x  y.
The central result of the paper is the following axiomatization of utility over
menus.
Theorem 1.3.1. A non-trivial preference  satisfies Weak Order, Hausdorff Con-
tinuity, Set-Betweenness and Mixture-Betweenness if and only if there exist u, v :
∆(X)× [0, 1]→ R such that:
1. u(., γ) and v(., γ) are vNM expected utility functions for all γ ∈ [0, 1].
2. u is continuous in its second argument on the interval (0, 1).
3. u(p, γ) = 1 and u(p, γ) = 0 for all γ ∈ [0, 1] for some p, p ∈ ∆(X).
4.  can be represented by a continuous utility function V : X → [0, 1] where, for
each x ∈ X , V (x) is the unique γ ∈ [0, 1] that solves
γ = max
p∈x
{u(p, γ) + v(p, γ)−max
q∈x
v(q, γ)}.
One feature of our model that is not shared by any other model in the menus
literature is that it does not reduce to expected utility over lotteries, that is, for
menus that offer commitment: x = {p} for some p ∈ ∆(X). Rather, it reduces to the
Chew-Dekel model for preference under risk:
V ({p}) = u({p}, V ({p})).
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Say that (u, v) represents  if it satisfies the conditions of Theorem 1.3.1. Note
that it is not the case that any (u, v) that satisfies conditions 1-3 in Theorem 1.3.1
implicitly defines a utility function V as in condition 4. In Appendix A.6 we provide
a set of sufficient conditions for (u, v) which guarantees the existence of an implicit
utility representation.
1.3.2 Uniqueness
To state the uniqueness properties of our model we require some additional terminol-
ogy. Given any pair of functions f, g : ∆(X) → R, we say that f is a positive affine
transformation of g if there exist a, b ∈ R such that a > 0 and f = ag + b. Similarly,
f is a negative affine transformation of g if there exist a, b ∈ R such that a < 0 and
f = ag + b.
Theorem 1.3.2. Let (u, v) and (u′, v′) be such that u(p, γ) = u′(p, γ) = 1 and
u(p, γ) = u′(p, γ) = 0 for all γ ∈ [0, 1] for some p, p ∈ ∆(X). Then both (u, v)
and (u′, v′) represent  if and only if for all γ ∈ (0, 1), u(., γ) = u′(., γ) and:
1. If v(., γ) is a positive affine transformation of u(., γ) or a constant, then v′(., γ)
is a positive affine transformation of v(., γ) or a constant.
2. If v(., γ) = −aγu(., γ) + bγ for some aγ ≥ 1 and bγ ∈ R, then
v′(., γ) = a′γv(., γ) + b
′
γ for some a
′
γ ≥ 1aγ and b
′
γ ∈ R.
3. If v(., γ) is not a constant or a positive affine transformation of u(., γ) and the
condition in 2 does not hold, then v′(., γ) = v(., γ) + bγ for some bγ ∈ R.
The uniqueness properties of u are completely characterized by the restriction of
 to ∆(X). In particular, for every p ∈ ∆(X), V (p) is the unique γ ∈ [0, 1] that
solves
γ = u(p, γ),
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where u(p, γ) = 1 and u(p, γ) = 0 for all γ ∈ [0, 1]. Dekel (1986) shows that such
representations are unique.
Because u is completely characterized by the restriction of  to menus that offer
commitment, we interpret the utility function implicitly defined by u as the agent’s
commitment preferences.
To aid intuition for the uniqueness properties of v we describe why the conditions
in Proposition 1.3.2 are sufficient. Assume (u, v) represents  and fix γ ∈ (0, 1). If
v(., γ) is a constant or a positive affine transformation of u(., γ), then for all x ∈ X ,
arg max
p∈x
v(p, γ) = arg max
p∈x




{u(p, γ) + v(p, γ)−max
p∈x
v(p, γ)} = max
p∈x
u(p, γ).
Thus, replacing v(., γ) with a constant or one of its positive affine transformations
does not affect the representation. If v(., γ) = −aγu(., γ) + bγ for some aγ ≥ 1, then
for all x ∈ X ,
arg max
p∈x






{u(p, γ)} ⊆ arg max
p∈x
{u(p, γ) + v(p, γ)}.
To see this, note that for any aγ ≥ 1 and p, q ∈ ∆(X) such that u(p, γ) ≥ u(q, γ),
u(p, γ)− u(q, γ) ≤ aγ(u(p, γ)− u(q, γ))
u(p, γ)− aγu(p, γ) + bγ ≤ u(q, γ)− aγu(q, γ) + bγ
u(p, γ) + v(p, γ) ≤ u(q, γ) + v(q, γ).
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Hence,
q ∈ arg min
p∈x
{u(p, γ)} =⇒ q ∈ arg max
p∈x




{u(p, γ) + v(p, γ)−max
p∈x
v(p, γ)} = min
p∈x
{u(p, γ)},
for all x ∈ X . Thus, if we replace v(., γ) with v(., γ) = a′γv(., γ)+b′γ for some a′γ ≥ 1aγ ,
then v′(., γ) is also a negative affine transformation of u(., γ) in which the coefficient
multiplying −u(., γ) is greater than or equal to one. Thus, the representation is not
affected. Finally, note that if v(., γ) is not a constant or a positive affine transforma-
tion of u(., γ) and the condition in 2 does not hold, then for any bγ ∈ R,
max
p∈x
{u(p, γ) + v(p, γ) + bγ −max
p∈x
{v(p, γ) + bγ}} = max
p∈x




Hence, replacing v(., γ) with v(., γ) + bγ does not affect the representation.
1.3.3 Illustration
We conclude this section by illustrating our model in the context of our motivating
example. Details concerning the calculations below can be found in Appendix A.4.
Recall the rankings in our motivating example:
{c} ∼ {c, f}  {f}
{αc+ (1− α)f ′}  {αc+ (1− α)f ′, αf + (1− α)f ′}.
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Consider the special case of our model in which the normative utility is linear and
independent of the overall level of utility. Let




, v(c, γ) =
1− γ
2
u(f) = 0, v(f, γ) =
γ
2
for all γ ∈ [0, 1]. For any lottery p ∈ ∆({c, f, f ′}), we will abuse notation and write
u(p) and v(p, γ) instead of
∑
a∈{c,f,f ′} p(a)u(a) and
∑
a∈{c,f,f ′} p(a)v(a, γ).
This special case of the model can accommodate the intuition behind the rankings
in the example. The reason is that for x = {c, f} and y = {αc+ (1− α)f ′, αf + (1−
α)f ′},
V (x) = u(p)
V (y) = u(p′) + v(p′, V (y))− v(q, V (y)),
where p = c, p′ = αc+ (1− α)f ′ and q = αf + (1− α)f ′. Hence, the model predicts
that the agent does not expect to feel any temptation if she faces {c, f} in the second
stage. However, if she faces {αc + (1 − α)f ′, αf + (1 − α)f ′}, then it suggests that
she expects to choose αc+ (1− α)f and be tempted by αf + (1− α)f ′. Further,
V ({f ′}) > V ({c}) = V ({c, f}) > V ({f})
V ({αc+ (1− α)f ′}) > V ({αc+ (1− α)f ′, αf + (1− α)f ′}),
where
V ({f ′}) = 1, V ({c}) = 1
2
, V ({c, f}) = 1
2
, V ({f}) = 0
V ({αc+ (1− α)f ′}) = 1− α
2




Hence, the model accommodates our motivating example.
1.3.4 Specialization
To the extent that a systematic study of temptation calls for us to attribute any non-
standard behavior to temptation, it is natural to attribute Independence violations
to temptation and self-control rather than to normative preferences. Accordingly, we
study a specialization of our model that retains linearity of normative preference and
attributes non-standard effects of randomization to temptation preferences. Conse-
quently, we consider:
Commitment Independence
{p}  {q} implies α{p}+ (1− α){r}  α{q}+ (1− α){r} for all α ∈ [0, 1] and
r ∈ ∆(X).
Commitment Independence requires that the agent’s commitment preference sat-
isfy the Independence axiom. Hence, a decision maker who views Independence over
lotteries as an appealing normative property will satisfy it. Further, it does not
restrict behavior over non-singleton menus and allows for violations of Independence.
Proposition 1.3.1. Suppose  satisfies the axioms of Theorem 1.3.1. Then  also
satisfies Commitment Independence if and only if it admits a representation as in
Theorem 1.3.1 in which u(., γ) = u(., γ′) for all γ, γ′ ∈ [0, 1].
Apart from being appealing from a modeling perspective, the illustration in the
previous section shows that it is also analytically convenient.
1.4 Commitment and Mixtures
1.4.1 General Self-Control Models
In the introduction we claimed that GP cannot accommodate mixture-dependent
preference for commitment because of the linearity of the normative and temptation
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preferences. Here we show that in fact, any temptation model that maintains linear-
ity of the normative and temptation preferences, and that satisfies Set-Betweenness
cannot accommodate mixture-dependent preference for commitment.
Recall that  has preference for commitment at y if there exists x ⊂ y such that
x  y. Noor and Takeoka (2015) show that any temptation model that satisfies Set-
Betweenness and maintains linearity of the normative and temptation preference can
be written in the following way:





for all menus x, where u and v are vNM utility functions over lotteries and c satisfies
the following three properties:
1. c is weakly increasing in its second argument and continuous in both arguments.
2. c(p, v(q)) > 0 implies v(q) > v(p).
3. u(p) > u(q) and v(p) < v(q) implies c(p, v(q)) > 0.
Intuitively, properties 1, 2 and 3 are the minimal properties c must possess in order to
be interpretable as a self-control cost function. In particular, property 1 says that the
higher the temptation, (weakly) higher the self-control is needed to resist it. Property
2 requires that if p is costly to choose in the presence of q, then it must be that q
offers higher temptation utility. Property 3 provides a converse in that if q provides
more temptation utility than p and there is conflict with the normative utility, then
the cost of choosing p must be strictly positive.
Noor and Takeoka (2010) refer to this class of models as general self -control
models, and identify them with the tuple (u, v, c).
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Proposition 1.4.1. Let (u, v, c) be a general self-control model and  the preference
it represents. Then for all x, y ∈ X :
1. If  has preference for commitment at x, then  has preference for commitment
at αx+ (1− α)y.
2. Suppose there is no preference for commitment at y. If  does not have a pref-
erence for commitment at x, then  does not have preference for commitment
at αx+ (1− α)y.
To illustrate why mixture-dependent preference for commitment necessitates a
violation of linearity of at least v, consider the following possible rankings involving
binary menus:
(∗) {p}  {p, q}  {q} and {αp+ (1− α)r} ∼ {αp+ (1− α)r, αq + (1− α)r}
(∗∗) {p} ∼ {p, q}  {q} and {αp+ (1− α)r}  {αp+ (1− α)r, αq + (1− α)r}.
Let (u, v, c) be a general self-control model and  the preference over menus it
represents. Noor and Takeoka (2015) show that
{p }  {p , q }  {q } =⇒ v(q) > v(p)
{p′} ∼ {p′, q′}  {q′} =⇒ v(p′) ≥ v(q′).
Hence, the rankings in (∗) imply
v(q) > v(p)
v(αp+ (1− α)r) ≥ v(αq + (1− α)r).
Thus, by linearity of v, v(q) > v(p) and v(q) ≤ v(p), an impossibility. Similarly, the
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rankings in (∗∗) imply
v(p) ≥ v(q)
v(αq + (1− α)r) ≥ v(αp+ (1− α)r).
Hence, by linearity of v, v(q) ≥ v(p) and v(q) < v(p), another impossibility.
1.4.2 Mixture Monotone Preference for Commitment
Here we specialize the model by focusing on the preference for commitment. In
particular, we characterize two monotone patterns it can take under Commitment
Independence and an additional assumption. In Appendix A.5.2 we provide the
corresponding results for the general model.
Mixture-Increasing Preference for Commitment
For all p and x such that  has preference for commitment at
αx+ (1− α){p} for some α ∈ [0, 1]:
I If {p}  x, then  has preference for commitment at βx+ (1− β){p} for all
0 < β < α.
II If x  {p}, then  has preference for commitment at βx+ (1−β){p} for all
β > α.
Mixture-Increasing Preference for commitment restricts how preference for com-
mitment can vary along mixtures. Indeed, Part I implies that if  has preference for
commitment at x, then  has preference for commitment at any mixture between x
and a superior menu that offers commitment {p}. On the other hand, Part II requires
that if the agent has preference for commitment at a mixture between a menu that
offers commitment {p} and a superior menu x, then increasing the weight on the
superior menu does not affect preference for commitment.
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The special case of our model described in Section 1.3.3 satisfies this axiom (see
Appendix A.4 for a proof). Hence, it is compatible with our motivating example.
Recall that in the example, the agent had preference for commitment at a mixture
between {c, f} and the superior menu {f ′} but not at {c, f}:
{αc+ (1− α)f ′}  {αc+ (1− α)f ′, αf + (1− α)f ′}
{c} ∼ {c, f}.
Thus, the axiom only requires that the agent has preference for commitment at {βc+
(1 − β)f ′, βf + (1 − β)f ′} for all 0 < β < α which is consistent with the behavior
prescribed by the model in Section 1.3.3.
To state the next result, we require some additional notation. Let p∗, p∗ denote
a fixed pair of lotteries such that {p∗}  x  {p∗} for all x ∈ X . Given our axioms
such lotteries always exist.4
Theorem 1.4.1. Assume  satisfies the axioms of Proposition 1.3.1 and {p∗} ∼
{p∗, p∗}. Then  satisfies Mixture-Increasing Preference for Commitment if and only
if there exists (u, v) that represents  such that 0 < γ′ < γ < 1 implies that there
exists bγ,γ′ ∈ R such that v(., γ′) + bγ,γ′ is a convex combination of u and v(., γ).
The assumption that {p∗} ∼ {p∗, p∗} implies that the agent does not expect to be
tempted by p∗ if she faces {p∗, p∗} in the second stage. This assumption guarantees
that for each γ ∈ [0, 1], v(., γ) is not a negative affine transformation of u. Theorem
1.4.1 shows that Mixture-Increasing Preference for Commitment forces the following
concrete relationship between u and v across different levels of utility: as utility
decreases, u and v(., γ) get “closer together”.
The following axiom characterizes the opposite case: as utility decreases, u and
v(., γ) move “further apart”.
4Weak Order and Continuity imply that the ordering over singleton menus has a best and worst
menu. Thus, by Set-Betweenness, all finite menus are between these two menus in terms of prefer-
ence. Hence, by Continuity the same holds for any menu.
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Mixture-Decreasing Preference for Commitment
For all p and x such that  has preference for commitment at
αx+ (1− α){p} for some α ∈ [0, 1]:
I If x  {p}, then  has preference for commitment at βx+ (1− β){p} for all
0 < β < α
II If {p}  x, then  has preference for commitment at βx+ (1−β){p} for all
β > α.
An agent modeled after this axiom would have mixture independent preference
for commitment when mixing with inferior menus that offer commitment. Its inter-
pretation is analogous to the interpretation of the previous axiom.
Part II of this axiom is inconsistent with the rankings in our motivating example.
In particular, an agent that satisfies II that has preference for commitment at {αc+
(1−α)f ′, αf + (1−α)f ′} would have preference for commitment at {c, f}. However,
it can be motivated by similar examples. To illustrate, consider again the traveler
but assume now that she wishes to stay at the fancy room but thinks that if she waits
to choose the room until she arrives at the hotel, then she will be tempted to choose
the conventional room to save money. Hence,
{f}  {c, f}.
Assume she receives the same promotion as in the motivating example: her name
will be added to a raffle in which the prize is a free night in the fancy room. The
possibility of staying for free in the fancy room makes her dream about it for the rest
of the day. Hence, if she waits until she arrives to choose the room, by then she will
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not find the cheap room tempting. Hence,
{αf + (1− α)f ′} ∼ {αc+ (1− α)f ′, αf + (1− α)f ′}.
This type of behavior is permitted by Mixture-Decreasing Preference for Commit-
ment. The reason is that this axiom is silent about behavior that involves a mixture
between a menu in which the agent has preference for commitment ({c, f}) and a
superior menu that offers commitment ({f ′}). However, it is inconsistent with Part I
of Mixture-Increasing Preference for Commitment. In particular, an agent that sat-
isfies Part I of that axiom that has preference for commitment at {c, f} would have
preference for commitment at {αc+ (1− α)f ′, αf + (1− α)f ′}.
Theorem 1.4.2. Assume  satisfies the axioms of Proposition 1.3.1 and {p∗} ∼
{p∗, p∗}. Then  satisfies Mixture-Decreasing Preference for Commitment if and
only if there exists (u, v) that represents  such that 0 < γ′ < γ < 1 implies that
there exists bγ,γ′ ∈ R such that v(., γ) + bγ,γ′ is a convex combination of u and v(., γ′).
1.5 Betweenness Mixture Space Theorem
In the introduction we briefly discussed that one of the contributions of the paper is to
provide a novel extension of the main result of Herstein and Milnor (1953), commonly
known as the Mixture Space Theorem. Here we provide our extension.
A mixture space is a non-empty set M which is endowed with an operation π,
π : [0, 1]×M×M→M
(a, x, y)→ πa(x, y),
where π satisfies the following three properties:
(A1) π1(x, y) = x.
(A2) πa(x, y) = π1−a(y, x) for all a ∈ [0, 1].
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(A3) πa(πb(x, y), y) = πab(x, y) for all a, b ∈ [0, 1].
Basically, a mixture space is an abstract version of a convex set.
Let  be a binary relation over a mixture space (M, π). Consider the following
axioms:
Weak Order  is complete and transitive.
Continuity x  y  z implies that there exist a, b ∈ (0, 1) such that πa(x, z)  y 
πb(x, z).
Independence x  y implies πa(x, z)  πa(y, z) for all z ∈M
and a ∈ [0, 1].
Theorem 1.5.1. (Mixture Space Theorem) Let  be a binary relation on a mixture
space (M, π). Then the following two statements are equivalent:
a)  satisfies Weak Order, Continuity and Independence.
b) There exists a utility function Φ :M→ R that represents  such that
∀x, y ∈M and a ∈ [0, 1], Φ(πa(x, y)) = aΦ(x) + (1− a)Φ(y). (1.4)
Further, Φ is unique up to a positive affine transformation.
Say that a function Φ :M→ R is mixture-linear if it satisfies (1.4). The Mixture
Space Theorem provides necessary and sufficient conditions for a preference to have
a mixture-linear utility representation. Our theorem characterizes a representation
where Φ instead conforms to an analogue of the Chew-Dekel utility representation.
However, it is less general than the Mixture Space Theorem in the sense that it only
applies to mixture spaces that satisfy the following additional property:
(A4) πa(πb(x, y), z) = πab(x, πa(1−b)
1−ab
(y, z)) ∀a, b ∈ [0, 1] such that ab 6= 1.
26
A4 requires that the order of the mixture does not matter. Hence, it is an associative
property. Thus we refer to any mixture space that satisfies A4 as an associative
mixture space. Not all mixture spaces are associative (see Mongin (2001) for an
example). However, any space that is isomorphic to a convex subset of a linear
space is an associative mixture space (examples include the frameworks employed in
Anscombe and Aumann (1963), Dekel et al. (2001) and the probability simplex).5
Not all associative mixture spaces have this feature. In particular, Stone (1949) and
Mongin (2001) show that the missing ingredient is the following property.
(A5) For any a ∈ (0, 1) and x ∈M, y 7→ πa(x, y) is injective.
Theorem 1.5.2. (Stone-Mongin) Let (M, π) be an associative mixture space. Then
the following two statements are equivalent:
a) (M, π) satisfies A5.
b) (M, π) is isomorphic to a convex subset of a linear space.
Thus, even though our result is not as general as the Mixture Space Theorem, it
applies to settings that are more general than convex subsets of linear spaces.
In our version of the Mixture Space Theorem, we replace the Independence axiom
with the following two axioms.
Mixture-Betweenness
x  y implies x  πa(x, y)  y for all a ∈ (0, 1), and
x ∼ y implies x ∼ πa(x, y) ∼ y for all a ∈ (0, 1).
Strict Best and Worst There exist x, x such that x  x  x for all x ∈M\{x, x}.
To state our result we require some additional terminology. Say that a function
V :M→ R is mixture-continuous if for all x, y ∈ M, V (πa(x, y)) is continuous as a
function of a.
5To the best of our knowledge, every mixture space employed in the Decision Theory literature
is associative.
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Theorem 1.5.3. Let  be a binary relation on an associative mixture space (M, π).
Then the following two statements are equivalent:
a)  satisfies Weak Order, Continuity, Mixture-Betweenness and Strict Best and
Worst.
b) There exists Φ :M× (0, 1)→ R such that
1.- Φ is continuous in its second argument on the interval (0, 1).
2.- Φ is mixture linear in its first argument for all γ ∈ (0, 1).
3.- Φ(x, γ) = 1,Φ(x, γ) = 0 for all γ ∈ (0, 1).
4.- Φ(x, γ) = γ has a unique solution for all x ∈M\{x, x}.
5.-  can be represented by a mixture-continuous function
V :M→ [0, 1] such that
V (x) =

1 x = x,
Φ(x, V (x)) x ∈ X\{x, x},
0 x = x.
Further, Φ(., γ) is unique for all γ ∈ (0, 1).
Mixture-Betweenness is obviously weaker than Independence. However, Strict
Best and Worst is unrelated to Independence and limits the generality of our theorem.
In Appendix A.1.5 we show that it can be deleted if the associative mixture space is
a compact and convex subset of a linear space and Continuity is replaced with the
following axiom.
Strong Continuity The sets {y|y  x} and {y|x  y} are closed for all x ∈M.
The proof of Theorem 1.5.3 is similar in spirit to the proofs in Chew (1989),
Dekel (1986) and Conlon (1995). However, they exploit properties of the probability
simplex that have no evident analog in our framework. More specifically, Chew (1989)
and Dekel (1986) use its geometric properties and Conlon (1995) uses its topological
properties. Hence, to prove the theorem we were forced to develop novel arguments.
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Due to its generality, Theorem 1.5.3 has several potential applications. In partic-
ular, it can be used to derive a natural counterpart of Dekel (1986) for the Anscombe-
Aumann domain (Anscombe and Aumann (1963)). In this setting with uncertainty
as opposed to risk, the result is a non-standard model of beliefs. More specifically,
let Ω be a finite state space. Consider a preference  over F = {f : Ω → ∆(X)},
set of all AA acts. In ongoing work, we use Theorem 1.5.3 as a stepping stone in the
axiomatization of a representation for  in which the utility of an AA act f is the





where u is a vNM utility function over lotteries and µ(., γ) is a probability measure
over Ω for all γ.
In a separate project, we use our result to generalize Dekel et al. (2001) and
therefore also Kreps (1979). In particular, we derive a counterpart of (1.5) in which
the state space is subjective. To be precise, we axiomatize a utility representation for








where S is a non-empty set (subjective state space), u(., s) is a vNM utility function
over lotteries for all s ∈ S and µ(., γ) is a probability measure over S for all γ.
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Chapter 2
Revealed Preference and the Subjective
State Space Hypothesis
2.1 Introduction
Kreps (1979) studies preferences over menus of deterministic alternatives. He shows
that a simple set of axioms characterizes a representation that can be interpreted as if
the agent is uncertain about her future tastes. This taste uncertainty is summarized
by a set of possible future preferences which is referred to as the subjective state space.
In Kreps’ model, the subjective state space is not completely pinned down by the
preference over menus. Dekel et al. (2001)(henceforth DLR) extend Kreps’ analysis
to menus of lotteries. This richer domain allows them to show that, under certain
assumptions, the subjective state space is “essentially unique” given the preference
over menus of lotteries.
Although DLR provide axiomatic foundations for several representations that have








where: A is a menu of lotteries, S is a non-empty set, Us is an expected utility function
for every s ∈ S, and µ is a finitely additive (signed) measure over S. As is typical of
the axiomatic approach, verification of their axioms requires that the entire preference
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order be observable. This paper provides a corresponding revealed preference analysis
assuming that only finitely many choices are observed. In particular, we assume that
we are given finitely many observations, each observation consists of a budget, that
is, a collection of menus of lotteries, and a choice from each budget.
Our main result shows that a suitable adaptation of the Independence axiom
for menus of lotteries to finite choice data sets characterizes the general additive
representation. We also provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the cases in
which µ is a positive measure; and when the subjective state space S is a singleton.
In their framework, DLR show that there is a distinction between preferences that
have an additive representation with an infinite state space and preferences that have
a representation with a finite state space. An implication of our results is that for
finite data sets there is no empirically meaningful distinction.
Our analysis builds on the revealed preference analysis for vNM utility theory
carried out by Fishburn (1975), Border (1992) and Kim (1996). Fishburn (1975)
considers lotteries over a finite abstract prize space; Border (1992) assumes the prize
space is a compact subset of the real line and studies the case in which the vNM utility
index is increasing. Kim (1996) generalizes Fishburn (1975) and Border (1992) by
considering lotteries over an abstract compact metric space. As in Fishburn (1975), we
consider an abstract finite prize space but we generalize the choice domain to menus of
lotteries. Restricted to singleton menus, our characterizing conditions are equivalent
to Fishburn’s condition for vNM utility theory. To the best of our knowledge this
is the first paper to provide a revealed preference analysis for any model with a
subjective state space component.
Finally, for the case in which each menu of lotteries is either finite or finitely
generated (that is, equal to the convex hull of a finite set), we show how our results
can be reformulated as a nonlinear system of inequalities and discuss the numerical
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methods that can be used to verify them. Hence, for this case, our results provide
a test that is, in principle, implementable. See Varian (1983), Chiappori (1988),
Diewert (2012) and Demuynck and Seel (2018) for other instances in the revealed
preference literature where characterizing conditions lead to nonlinear inequalities.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 gives the general model. Section 2.3
states the main results. Section 2.4 contains a discussion of our results. Appendices
B.1-B.2 contain the proofs of our results and Appendix B.3 describes the aforemen-
tioned systems of inequalities and applicable numerical methods.
2.2 The Model
Let X be a finite set of cardinality n. A lottery is a probability measure over X. The
set of all lotteries is denoted ∆(X) and P (∆(X)) denotes the set of all its non-empty
subsets.
A choice problem (c,B, T ) is an index set T = {1, ..., T}, a collection of sets of
menus of lotteries, called budgets; B = {Bt|t ∈ T} where Bt ⊆ P (∆(X)); and a
function c : T → P (∆(X)) such that ct ∈ Bt for all t ∈ T . Generic menus will be
denoted A,B and generic lotteries will be denoted p, q.
Definition 2.2.1. A choice problem (c,B, T ) is rationalizable by an additive rep-
resentation if there exist a non-empty set S, a state dependent utility function
U : S ×∆(X) → R such that Us is an expected utility function for all s ∈ S, and a










If µ is positive, we say (c,B, T ) is rationalizable by a monotone additive repre-
sentation. If |S| = 1, we say (c,B, T ) is rationalizable by a strategically rational
representation.1
1To be more precise, we require that S be a measurable space and that U be measurable with
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Our notion of rationalizability requires that the chosen menu be strictly preferred
to any of the rejected menus. If we were to require only weak preference, then any
choice problem would be rationalizable by a strategically rational representation with
a constant expected utility function.
The case |S| = 1 is of particular interest because of its relation to vNM utility
theory. A strategically rational agent knows what she is going to choose from the
menu. If the agent chooses A over B, then there exists a lottery p ∈ A such that she
would choose {p} over B.
The difference between a monotone additive and an additive representation is that
the former does not allow smaller menus to be strictly preferable. It prescribes that
given menus B ⊂ A, the agent would choose A over B because of the extra flexibility
A provides. However, there are situations (temptation and costly self-control, see Gul
and Pesendorfer (2001)) in which flexibility is costly and commitment is valuable. The
additive representation allows for both.
Given a collection A1, ..., AT of menus of lotteries and a probability measure λ ∈
∆(T ), a mixture of these menus is defined as
∑
t
λtAt = {p ∈ ∆(X)|p =
∑
t
λtpt, pt ∈ At}.
2.3 Main Results
In this section we state our main result for choice problems (c,B, T ) such that each
budget is binary. In the next section we discuss to what extent this binariness as-
sumption is without loss of generality.
respect to this space. Since we make no explicit use of such measurability considerations, we avoid
a discussion of the details.
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Theorem 2.3.1. Let (c,B, T ) be a choice problem such that for all t ∈ T , Bt = {ct, dt}
where ct and dt are closed and convex sets of lotteries and ct is the chosen menu out
of Bt. For each of the following rationalizability properties the conditions indicated
are necessary and sufficient.
Strategically Rational There exist pt ∈ ct, t = 1, ..., T , such that∑
t λtpt 6∈
∑










t λtdt ∀λ ∈ ∆(T ).
Moreover, if (c,B, T ) is rationalizable by an (monotone) additive representation, then
it is also rationalizable by an (monotone) additive representation with a finite state
space of cardinality less than or equal to T .
At first glance it may seem that the conditions characterizing the strategically
rational and monotone additive cases are equivalent. This is not true: the strategically
rational case requires that for some fixed p1, ...., pT such that pt ∈ ct for all t ∈ T ,∑
t λtpt 6∈
∑
t λtdt ∀ λ ∈ ∆(T ), whereas in the monotone additive case the pt’s can
vary with λ. To illustrate, let (c,B, T ) be such that
T = {1, 2}, c1 = {p}, d1 = {q}, c2 = ∆({p, q}) and d2 = {p}.
This choice problem is rationalizable by a monotone additive representation but not
by a strategically rational one: fix any r ∈ ∆({p, q}), then
λp+ (1− λ)r = λp+ (1− λ)(αp+ (1− α)q)
= (λ+ (1− λ)α)p+ (1− λ)(1− α)q,
for some α ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, if λ = (1−α)
2−α , then λp+ (1− λ)r = λq + (1− λ)p. Hence,
@ p1 ∈ c1, p2 ∈ c2 such that λp1 + (1− λ)p2 6∈ λd1 + (1− λ)d2 for all λ ∈ ∆(T ), which
is a violation of our condition for strategic rationality.2
2Any monotone additive representation such that S = {s1, s2}, µ(s1) = µ(s2) > 0 and Us1(p) >
Us2(q) > Us2(p) > Us1(q) rationalizes (c,B, T ).
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The main content in Theorem 2.3.1 is that the indicated conditions are sufficient
for rationalizability. In addition, the theorem shows that there is no meaningful
empirical difference between representations with infinite state spaces and represen-
tations with finite state spaces. Moreover, the number of budgets provides an upper
bound on the minimum number of states needed for rationalizability.3
As described next, it is straightforward to show that the indicated conditions are
necessary for rationalizability. Any preference  over P (∆(X)) that has a strate-
gically rational, monotone additive or additive representation satisfies the following
axiom (by DLR’s Theorem 4).4
Independence For any λ ∈ (0, 1], A  B implies λA+ (1− λ)C  λB + (1− λ)C.
If (c,B, T ) is rationalizable by an additive representation, then the preference  over





t λtdt for every λ ∈ ∆(T ). Hence,
∑
t λtct 6=∑
t λtdt for every λ ∈ ∆(T ). Moreover, if the representation is monotone additive,
then (by DLR’s Theorem 4), B ⊆ A implies A  B . Hence, there cannot exist




t λtdt. Finally, if the representation is strategically
rational, then for any closed and convex menu A there exists a lottery p ∈ A such
that {p} ∼ A. To see this take p ∈ arg max
p∈A
U(p), then {p} ∼ A. The pt’s that appear
in the condition characterizing strategic rationality are the ones prescribed by this




t λtdt ∀λ ∈ ∆(T ).
The conditions that appear in Theorem 2.3.1 cannot be verified directly as there
are uncountably many λ’s in ∆(T ) if |T | > 1. Moreover, an existential quantifier
appears in the condition that characterizes the strategically rational representation.
Appendix B.3 shows that for the case in which each menu is either finite or finitely
3The argument for the proof of the bound on the state space was inspired by an exchange with
Chris Chambers.
4A preference is a complete and transitive binary relation.
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generated, the conditions can be expressed as nonlinear systems of inequalities. Then
it discusses numerical methods that can be used to check for existence of a solution.
Finally, the next proposition shows that whenever the number of observations T
is less than or equal to the cardinality n of the set of alternatives X, then the bound
given by Theorem 2.3.1 is tight.
Proposition 2.3.1. If n ≥ T , then there exists a rationalizable choice problem
(c,B, T ) such that every (monotone) additive representation that rationalizes (c,B, T )
has at least T states.
To provide intuition about the previous proposition we give a sketch of the proof:
Suppose n ≥ T and let (c,B, T ) be such that
ct = ch({δ1, ..., δT})
dt = ch({δ1, ..., δt−1, δt+1, ..., δT})
where ch(.) denotes the convex hull and δi is the degenerate lottery that gives al-
ternative xi with probability 1. By Theorem 2.3.1 (c,B, T ) is rationalizable by an
additive representation. The proof of the proposition amounts to showing that every
additive representation that rationalizes (c,B, T ) has at least T states. Intuitively,
the choices reveal that for each δi there is a state s such that Us(δi) > Us(q) for all
q ∈ ∆({δ1, ..., δT})\{δi}. Hence, any additive representation that rationalizes (c,B, T )
has at least T states.
2.4 Discussion
Above we assumed that for each t ∈ T , the agent chooses between two menus. For the
characterization part of Theorem 2.3.1, this assumption is without loss of generality as
long as each budget has finitely many menus. To see this, consider a choice problem
(c,B, T ) such that T = {1} and B1 = {c1, d1,1, d1,2}. Let (c′,B′, T ′) be such that
T ′ = {1, 2}, B′1 = {c1, d1,1}, B′2 = {c1, d1,2}, c′(1) = c1 and c′(2) = c1. Then (c,B, T ) is
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rationalizable by a strategically rational, monotone additive or additive representation
if and only if (c′,B′, T ′) is rationalizable by a strategically rational, monotone additive
or additive representation respectively. This kind of “decomposition of choices” can
be done for any (c,B, T ) such that each budget contains finitely many menus. Hence,
it is enough to consider budgets that contain only two menus. However, the bound
on the cardinality of the state space must be modified if binariness is dropped. In
general, the bound equals the total number of rejected menus (that is,
∑
t∈T |Bt\ct|).
For example, if we were to observe a single choice from a budget that contains 26
menus, then the bound equals 25.
The closed and convex assumption is also without loss of generality: consider a
choice problem (c,B, T ) such that at least one of the menus is not closed or convex.
We can always construct another choice problem (c′,B′, T ) by replacing each menu
with the closure of its convex hull. It follows from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 in DLR that
(c,B, T ) is rationalizable by a strategically rational, monotone additive or additive
representation if and only if (c′,B′, T ) is rationalizable by a strategically rational,
monotone additive or additive representation respectively.
Note that Theorem 2.3.1 implies that if we observe a single choice c1 ⊂ d1, then
the choice cannot be rationalized by a monotone additive representation. However, we
cannot conclude that the agent does not value flexibility. It could be the case that the
agent does value flexibility but that the extra lotteries in d1 do not add any flexibility.
Hence, whenever a choice problem does not satisfy the characterizing condition for
monotone additive representation in Theorem 2.3.1 we can only conclude that the
choices do not reveal a (strict) preference for flexibility. This limitation comes from
the requirement that ct be strictly preferred to dt.
An agent that behaves as the strategically rational representation prescribes has no
subjective uncertainty about her future taste. When evaluating a menu she considers
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only the best lottery according to her future tastes. Our characterizing condition
reflects this taste certainty as the pt’s that appear in the condition are understood to
be what the agent anticipates she will choose. For an agent that admits a monotone
additive representation this is no longer true. In particular, she is uncertain about her
future tastes. This taste uncertainty makes “smaller” menus less desirable because
the agent does not desire to commit to any particular lottery. Any behavior that
would suggest that the agent would prefer to commit to a smaller menu when a
bigger one (in the sense of set inclusion) is available is ruled out by our condition.
Finally, an agent that admits an additive representation is also uncertain about her
future tastes but considers some of her possible future tastes to be harmful ex ante.
These “bad” states are the ones that are assigned a negative weight by the signed
measure. Therefore in some situations bigger menus might be less desirable than
smaller ones and in other situations they might be more desirable. Thus, there is
no consistency requirement between the choices of the agent other than rationality
in the sense of weak order and Independence which are completely captured by our
condition.
We conclude the discussion of our results by relating our characterizing conditions
to DLR’s axioms. DLR shows that Independence is the main ingredient of all the
representations we consider. Moreover, they show that the only distinction between
the monotone additive and the additive representations is that the former satisfies
monotonicity.5 Our condition for the monotone additive representation captures the
joint content of monotonicity and Independence, while the condition for the additive
representation captures the content of Independence for finite choice data.
5A preference  over P (∆(X)) satisfies monotonicity if B ⊆ A implies A  B
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2.4.1 Relation to Fishburn (1975) and Border (1992)
The condition for strategic rationality in Theorem 2.3.1 is an adaptation of Fishburn’s
result to menus of lotteries. Fishburn’s result can be expressed in our setup as follows.
Let (c,B, T ) be a choice problem such that Bt = {{pt}, {qt}} and c(t) = {pt}
for all t ∈ T . (c,B, T ) is rationalizable by vNM if there exists an expected utility
function u : ∆(X)→ R such that for all t ∈ T ,
u(pt) > u(qt).
Theorem 2.4.1. (Fishburn (1975)) Let (c,B, T ) be a choice problem such that Bt =





t λtqt ∀λ ∈ ∆(T ).
To see the relation to our characterizing condition for strategic rationality, fix a
choice problem (c,B, T ) as in Theorem 2.3.1. Our condition is satisfied if and only if
there exist p1, ..., pT such that any choice problem (c
′,B′, T ), with
B′t = {{pt}, {qt}}, c(t) = {pt} and qt ∈ dt for all t ∈ T,
satisfies Fishburn’s condition. Note that for choice problems such that every menu
contains a single lottery, each of the conditions in Theorem 2.3.1 is equivalent to
Fishburn’s.
Border (1992) considers an observable choice function over sets of lotteries, where
all lotteries are over monetary outcomes. He shows that if the choices are not consis-
tent with expected utility maximization of an increasing vNM utility function, then
there is a way to create a compound lottery using the rejected lotteries that stochas-
tically dominates the compound lottery created by using the chosen lotteries. Our
result for the monotone additive case is in the same spirit. In particular, Theorem
2.3.1 implies that if a choice problem is not rationalizable by a monotone additive
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representation, then we can construct a compound menu using the rejected menus
that dominates, in the sense of set inclusion, the compound menu created by using
the chosen menus.
2.4.2 Relation to Kreps (1979)
To understand the relation between our results and Kreps (1979), we define the
analogous setup for menus of alternatives.
Definition 2.4.1. A Kreps choice problem is a tuple (cK ,BK , T ) such that T =
{1, ..., T}, BK = {BKt |t ∈ T} where BKt ⊆ P (X) and cK : T → P (X) is such that
cKt ∈ BKt for all t ∈ T .
Generic menus of alternatives will be denoted by AK and BK and generic alter-
natives will be denoted a, b. We proceed to define the representation considered in
Kreps (1979) in this setup.6
Definition 2.4.2. A Kreps choice problem (cK ,BK , T ) is rationalizable by a Kreps
additive representation if there exist a non-empty finite set S, and a state depen-










A Kreps choice problem (cK ,BK , T ) is rationalizable by a utility function if there
exists a function U : P (X)→ R such that: for all t ∈ T and dKt ∈ BKt \cKt ,
U(cKt ) > U(d
K
t ).
Given a Kreps choice problem (cK ,BK , T ), construct the analogous choice problem
6Since we assumed that the set of alternatives is finite, by Theorem 1 in Kreps (1979), it is enough
to consider representations with finite state spaces.
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(c,B, T ) such that for all t ∈ T ,
ct = ch({δa|a ∈ cKt })
dt = ch({δb|b ∈ dKt })
where δa and δb are the degenerate lotteries that give a and b with probability one
respectively and ch(.) denotes the convex hull. Hence, we can map Kreps data into
our setup.
The next proposition shows that Kreps choice problems are rationalizable by a
Kreps additive representation if and only if the analogous choice problem in our
setup is rationalizable by a monotone additive representation. Moreover, a Kreps
choice problem is rationalizable by a utility function if and only if the analogous
choice problem in our setup is rationalizable by an additive representation.
Proposition 2.4.1. Given a Kreps choice problem (cK ,BK , T ) and its analogue
(c,B, T ):
1. (cK ,BK , T ) is rationalizable by a Kreps additive representation if and only if
(c,B, T ) is rationalizable by a monotone additive representation.
2. (cK ,BK , T ) is rationalizable by a utility function if and only if (c,B, T ) is ra-
tionalizable by an additive (not necessarily monotone) representation.
Part 1 allows us to conclude that our results also provide a characterization of
Kreps’ representation. Moreover, for any Kreps choice problem, all the menus of
lotteries in the budgets of the analogous choice problem in our setup are finitely
generated. Hence, the results in Appendix B.3 provide an implementable test for the
Kreps additive representation. Part 2 follows from Propositions 1 and 3 in Gorno
(2016).
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Kreps’ Theorem 1 shows that a preference K over P (X) has a Kreps additive
representation if and only if it satisfies
K-1 AK ⊆ BK implies BK K AK
K-2 AK ∼K AK ∪BK implies that for all DK , AK ∪DK ∼K AK ∪BK ∪DK .
Our condition reflects the first axiom because any violation of K-1 in (cK ,BK , T )
would imply a violation of our condition in (c,B, T ). However, our condition does
not reflect the second axiom. This is not surprising because, in the menu of lotteries
framework, K-2 is redundant in the presence of monotonicity and Independence.





A.1 Proofs for Section 1.5
Preliminaries
Lemma A.1.1. Let  be a binary relation over a Mixture Space (M, π) that satisfies
Weak Order, Continuity and Mixture-Betweenness. Then:
1. x  y and 0 ≤ a < b ≤ 1 implies πb(x, y)  πa(x, y).
2. For all x, y and z the following sets are closed:
{a|πa(x, y)  z} and {a|z  πa(x, y)}.
3. If x  z  y, then there exists a unique a ∈ (0, 1) such that z ∼ πa(x, y).
The proof of this lemma is provided in Appendix A.1.4.
A.1.1 Sufficiency
Lemma A.1.1 shows that for each x ∈M there exists a unique γ(x) ∈ [0, 1] such that
x ∼ πγ(x)(x, x). Define
V (x) ≡ γ(x).
Then, by standard arguments, V is mixture-continuous and represents . Now we
proceed with the construction of Φ.
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For each γ ∈ (0, 1), let xγ denote πγ(x̄, x) and I(γ) = {x|x ∼ xγ}. Our goal is to
construct a mixture-linear Φ(., γ) such that it represents an artificial preference that
has indifference curves that are “parallel” to I(γ). Informally, x, y are in a “higher”
artificial indifference curve parallel to I(γ) if πa(x, x) ∼ xγ and πa(y, x) ∼ xγ. The









Similarly, x, y are in a “lower” artificial indifference curve parallel to I(γ) if
πa(x, x) ∼ xγ and πa(y, x) ∼ xγ.
Consider the mapping λ :M× (0, 1)→ [0, 1] given by
λ(x, γ) =

a|πa(x, x) ∼ xγ if V (x) > γ
1 if V (x) = γ
b|πb(x, x̄) ∼ xγ if V (x) < γ.
By Lemma A.1.1, λ is well defined. λ can be used to define an artificial preference
that has indifference curves parallel to I(γ): if either x, y  xγ or xγ  x, y, then x, y
are in the same artificial indifference curve if and only if λ(x, γ) = λ(y, γ). Φ(., γ)
would represent such artificial preference. Hence, mixture linearity of Φ(., γ), the fact
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that Φ(x, γ) = 1 and Φ(x, γ) = 0, and the definition of λ would imply that if x  xγ,
then
Φ(πλ(x,γ)(x, x), γ) = Φ(xγ, γ)




A similar argument shows that if xγ  x, then
Φ(x, γ) = 1− 1− γ
λ(x, γ)
.





if V (x) > γ
γ if V (x) = γ
1− 1−γ
λ(x,γ)
if V (x) < γ.
Notice that Φ(x, γ) = γ if and only if V (x) = γ. Further,
V (x), V (y) ≥ γ =⇒ Φ(x, γ) ≥ Φ(y, γ) ⇐⇒ λ(x, γ) ≤ λ(y, γ)
V (x) ≥ γ ≥ V (y) =⇒ Φ(x, γ) ≥ Φ(y, γ)
V (x), V (y) ≤ γ =⇒ Φ(x, γ) ≥ Φ(y, γ) ⇐⇒ λ(x, γ) ≥ λ(y, γ).
We will show that Φ(., γ) is mixture linear and continuous in its second argument.
In our proof we employ the following lemma that describes several properties of λ.
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Lemma A.1.2. If  satisfies the axioms of Theorem 1.5.3, then λ satisfies the fol-
lowing properties:
1. V (x), V (y) ≥ γ =⇒ λ(πa(x, y), γ) = λ(x,γ)λ(y,γ)aλ(y,γ)+(1−a)λ(x,γ) for all a ∈ [0, 1].
2. V (x), V (y) ≤ γ =⇒ λ(πa(x, y), γ) = λ(x,γ)λ(y,γ)aλ(y,γ)+(1−a)λ(x,γ) for all a ∈ [0, 1].
3. V (x), V (y) > γ > V (z) and λ(x, γ) < λ(y, γ)
=⇒ λ(πa(x, z), γ) = λ(y, γ) for a unique a ∈ (0, 1).
4. V (x), V (y) < γ < V (z) and λ(x, γ) < λ(y, γ)
=⇒ λ(πa(x, z), γ) = λ(y, γ) for a unique a ∈ (0, 1).
5. V (x), V (y) > γ > V (z), λ(x, γ) = λ(y, γ) and πa(x, z) ∼ xγ
=⇒ πa(y, z) ∼ xγ.
6. V (x), V (y) < γ < V (z), λ(x, γ) = λ(y, γ) and πa(x, z) ∼ xγ
=⇒ πa(y, z) ∼ xγ.
The proof is provided in Appendix A.1.4. Here we provide two figures that illus-
trate properties 3 (Figure A·2) and 5 (Figure A·3).
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Notice that properties 1 and 2 imply that if x, y are both above or both below
I(γ) in terms of preferences, then
λ(πa(x, y), γ) = (aλ(x, γ)
−1 + (1− a)λ(y, γ)−1)−1.
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Hence, λ(πa(x, y), γ) is the harmonic weighted mean of λ(x, γ) and λ(y, γ).
Φ(., γ) is Mixture Linear
Fix x, y ∈M, γ ∈ (0, 1) and a ∈ (0, 1). Assume WLOG that V (x) ≥ V (y). Then, by
Mixture-Betweenness, V (x) ≥ V (πa(x, y)) ≥ V (y). We will show that
Φ(πa(x, y), γ) = aΦ(x, γ) + (1− a)Φ(y, γ).
There are four possible cases to consider: (i) V (x) ≥ V (y) ≥ γ. (ii) γ ≥ V (x) ≥ V (y).
(iii) V (x) ≥ V (πa(x, y)) ≥ γ ≥ V (y). (iv) V (x) ≥ γ ≥ V (πa(x, y)) ≥ V (y).
Since the proofs of (i) and (ii) are analogous, and the proofs of (iii) and (iv) are
analogous we only consider (i) (Lemma A.1.3) and (iii) (Lemma A.1.4).
Lemma A.1.3. V (x), V (y) ≥ γ =⇒ Φ(πa(x, y), γ) = aΦ(x, γ) + (1− a)Φ(y, γ).
Proof. First note that if V (x) = V (y) = γ, then there is nothing to prove. Assume
V (x) > V (y) ≥ γ. Then, by Mixture-Betweenness, V (πa(x, y)) > γ. Thus,














+ (1− a) γ
λ(y, γ)
= aΦ(x, γ) + (1− a)Φ(y, γ).
where the second equality follows from Part 1 of Lemma A.1.2.
Lemma A.1.4. V (x) > γ > V (y) and V (πa(x, y)) ≥ γ =⇒
Φ(πa(x, y), γ) = aΦ(x, γ) + (1− a)Φ(y, γ).
Proof. Let b ∈ (0, 1) be the unique scalar such that
πb(x, y) ∼ xγ.
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The proof of this lemma is done in two steps:
Step 1: Calculate Φ(πa(x, y), γ)










πa(x, y)  xγ implies a ≥ b. Let c = a−b1−b . We claim that πa(x, y) = πc(x, πb(x, y)).
To prove this claim note that




1− (1− c)(1− b) = 1− (1− a− b
1− b
)(1− b)
= 1− (1− b− (a− b)))
= a.
Hence, πa(x, y) = πc(x, πb(x, y)). Moreover, since V (x), V (πb(x, y)) ≥ γ, by Part 1 of
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Lemma A.1.2,
λ(πc(x, πb(x, y)), γ) =
λ(x, γ)







= (1− b) λ(x, γ)
(a− b) + (1− a)λ(x, γ)
.
Hence,
Φ(πa(x, y), γ) = Φ(πc(x, πb(x, y)), γ)
= γ
1






a− b+ (1− a)λ(x, γ)
(1− b)λ(x, γ)
.
Step 2: Calculate aΦ(x, γ)+(1−a)Φ(y, γ) and show it is equal to Φ(πa(x, y), γ)
To calculate aΦ(x, γ) + (1− a)Φ(y, γ) we first need to derive the relation between
λ(y, γ), λ(x, γ), γ and b. In particular, we need to show that
λ(y, γ) =
(1− b)λ(x, γ)(γ − 1)
λ(x, γ)(γ − 1)− b(γ − λ(x, γ))
. (A.1)
To prove (A.1) we need to distinguish between two cases: (i) λ(x, γ) > λ(x, γ).
(ii) λ(x, γ) ≤ λ(x, γ). The proof of both cases is analogous. Thus, we only consider
(i).
Assume λ(x, γ) > λ(x, γ). By Part 3 of Lemma A.1.2 there exists a unique
d ∈ (0, 1) such that λ(πd(y, x), γ) = λ(x, γ). First we show that λ(y, γ) = 1−b(1−d).












By Part 5 of Lemma A.1.2, πb(πd(y, x), y) ∼ xγ. Further,
πb(πd(y, x), y) = πb(π1−d(x, y), y)
= πb(1−d)(x, y)
= π1−b(1−d)(y, x).
Hence πλ(y,γ)(y, x) = πb(πd(y, x), y) and λ(y, γ) = 1− b(1− d).
Next, we need to replace d in λ(y, γ) = 1 − b(1 − d) with eλ(y, γ) where e =
γ−λ(x,γ)










First we show that e ∈ (0, 1) and πd(y, x) = πe(πλ(y,γ)(y, x), x). To prove this,
first note that γ = λ(x, γ) so λ(x, γ) > λ(x, γ) and γ ∈ (0, 1) imply e > 0. Further,
λ(x, γ) ∈ (0, 1). Thus,
γ > λ(x, γ)γ
γ − λ(x, γ) > λ(x, γ)γ − λ(x, γ)
γ − λ(x, γ)
λ(x, γ)(γ − 1)
< 1.
Next, note that
πe(πλ(y,γ)(y, x), x) = πeλ(y,γ)(y, x).
Therefore, by Part 1 of Lemma A.1.2,
λ(πe(πλ(y,γ)(y, x), x), γ) =
λ(x)
eλ(x, γ) + (1− e)
.
Notice that if e = γ−λ(x,γ)
λ(x,γ)(γ−1) , then







γλ(x, γ)(γ − 1)
γ(γ − λ(x, γ)) + γ(λ(x, γ)− 1)
=
λ(x, γ)(γ − 1)
(γ − λ(x, γ)) + (λ(x, γ)− 1)
= λ(x, γ).
Hence, by the uniqueness in Part 3 of Lemma A.1.2, d = eλ(y, γ). Thus,
λ(y, γ) = 1− b(1− d)





(1− b)λ(x, γ)(γ − 1)




We conclude the proof of this step by showing aΦ(x, γ) + (1− a)Φ(y, γ) =
Φ(πa(x, y)).
aΦ(x, γ) + (1− a)Φ(y, γ) = a γ
λ(x, γ)






+ (1− a)(1− (1− γ)λ(x, γ)(γ − 1)− b(γ − λ(x, γ))





+ (1− a)(1− (1− γ)b(γ − λ(x, γ))− λ(x, γ)(γ − 1)

















(a− ab+ λ(x, γ)− b− aλ(x, γ) + ab)
= γ
(a− b) + λ(x, γ)(1− a)
λ(x, γ)(1− b)
= Φ(πa(x, y), γ).
Φ is continuous in its second argument
To show that Φ is continuous in its second argument it is enough to show that λ is
continuous in its second argument.
Lemma A.1.5. λ is continuous in its second argument.
Proof. Fix x ∈ M, γ ∈ (0, 1) and γn such that γn → γ. There are three possible
cases: (i) V (x) > γ. (ii) V (x) < γ. (iii) V (x) = γ. The proof of case (i) is analogous
to the proof of cases (ii) and (iii). Hence, we only consider (i).
Assume V (x) < γ. By standard arguments, it is without loss to assume V (x) < γn
for all n. Let λn = λ(x, γn) and assume towards a contradiction that λn 6→ λ(x, γ).
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Then, there exists a neighborhood B(λ(x, γ)) such that λn 6∈ B(λ(x, γ)). Let λm
denote the corresponding subsequence. Since λm is a subsequence in [0, 1], there ex-
ists a convergent subsequence λl with limit λ
∗ 6= λ(x, γ). Then, either πλ∗(x, x) 
πλ(x,γ)(x, x) or πλ(x,γ)(x, x)  πλ∗(x, x). The proof that either case leads to a con-
tradiction is analogous. Hence, we only consider the case in which πλ∗(x, x) 
πλ(x,γ)(x, x).
By Continuity there exists z such that πλ∗(x, x)  z  πλ(x,γ)(x, x). Further, by
Lemma A.1.1, there exists N such that l > N implies πλl(x, x)  z. Since πλl(x, x) ∼
πγl(x, x) for all l and πλ(x,γ)(x, x) ∼ xγ, then by Lemma A.1.1, πγl(x, x)  z for all
l > N and γl → γ implies πγ(x, x)  z a contradiction.
A.1.2 Necessity
The proof of necessity of Weak Order, Archimedian Continuity and Strict Best
and Worst is routine. Hence, we only show the representation satisfies Mixture-
Betweenness
Preliminaries
Say that Φ represents  if it satisfies the conditions of Theorem 1.5.3.
Lemma A.1.6. Assume Φ represents . Then for any x such that V (x) ∈ (0, 1),
the following two properties hold:
1. Φ(x, γ) < γ implies V (x) < γ.
2. Φ(x, γ) > γ implies V (x) > γ.
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that there exists γ and x such that V (x) ≥ γ
and Φ(x, γ) < γ. If V (x) = γ, then by the unique solution property, Φ(x, γ) = γ,
a contradiction. Thus, V (x) > γ. Since Φ(x, γ) < γ < 1, there exists a ∈ (0, 1)
such that aΦ(x, γ) + (1 − a) = γ. Hence, V (πa(x, x)) = γ < V (x) < 1. Since V
is mixture-continuous, there exists b ∈ (0, 1) such that V (πb(x, x)) = V (x), Hence,
V (x) = bΦ(x, V (x)) + (1− b) = bV (x) + (1− b), a contradiction.
Property 2 Follows from an analogous argument, the only difference is that one
needs to use x instead of x to derive a contradiction.
Next, we complete the proof. Showing that V (x) = V (y) implies
V (x) = V (πa(x, y)) = V (y) for all a ∈ (0, 1) is straight forward. Assume V (x) > V (y)
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and let γ = V (πa(x, y)). Then
γ = aΦ(x, γ) + (1− a)Φ(y, γ).
Notice that if γ = V (x) or γ = V (y), then the unique solution property implies a
contradiction of V (x) > V (y). If γ > V (x), then by Lemma A.1.6, γ > Φ(x, γ) and
γ > Φ(y, γ). Thus, γ = aΦ(x, γ) + (1− a)Φ(y, γ) does not have a solution. Similarly,
if γ < V (y), then by Lemma A.1.6 γ < Φ(x, γ) and γ < Φ(y, γ). Therefore, and
γ = aΦ(x, γ) + (1− a)Φ(y, γ) does not have a solution. Hence, γ ∈ (V (y), V (x)).
A.1.3 Uniqueness
Preliminaries
The proof will employ the following lemma which states that if two preferences that
satisfy Weak Order, Archimedean Continuity and Independence share an indifference
curve, then they are equal.
Lemma A.1.7. Let  and ′ be two binary relations on a Mixture Space (M, π)
that satisfy Weak Order, Archimedean Continuity and Independence. Assume
1. {x|x ∼ πa(x, x)} = {x|x ∼′ πa(x, x)} for some a ∈ (0, 1).
2. x  x and x ′ x.
Then =′.
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that there exist x, y such that x  y and
y ′ x. Since  is complete, then there are two possible cases: y  πa(x, x) and
πa(x, x)  y. The proof that either case leads to a contradiction is analogous. Hence,
we only consider the case in which y  πa(x, x).
Assume y  πa(x, x). Then there exists b such that πb(y, x) ∼ πa(x, x). Hence,
πb(y, x) ∼′ πa(x, x). Since x  y and y ′ x, by Independence,
πb(x, x)  πb(y, x) ∼ πa(x, x) and πa(x, x) ∼ πb(y, x) ′ πb(x, x)
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Thus, there exists c < b such that πc(x, x) ∼ πa(x, x) and πa(x, x) ′ πc(x, x) a
contradiction.
Next, we complete the proof. First we show that if Φ and Φ′ represent , then
V = V ′. To see this, note that
V (πγ(x, x)) = γ
V ′(πγ(x, x)) = γ
for all γ ∈ (0, 1). Hence, V (x) and V ′(x) are the unique γ such that x ∼ πγ(x, x).
Thus, V = V ′.
To see that Φ = Φ′ let γ and γ′ be the preference represented by Φ(., γ) and
Φ′(., γ) respectively. Then,
{x|x ∼ πγ(x, x)} = {x|x ∼′ πγ(x, x)}.
Thus, by Lemma A.1.7, γ=′γ. By the Mixture Space Theorem, Φ(., γ) is the unique
mixture-linear representation of γ in which Φ(x, γ) = 1 and Φ(x, γ) = 0. Hence,
Φ = Φ′.
A.1.4 Proofs of Lemmas A.1.1- A.1.2
Preliminaries
Lemma A.1.8. Assume (M, π) is an Associative Mixture Space. Then, for all
x, y, z ∈M and a, b, c ∈ [0, 1] such that ca+ (1− c)b 6= 0,




Proof. Fix x, y, z ∈M and a, b, c ∈ [0, 1] such that ca+ (1− c)b 6= 0. Then,
πc(πa(x, y), πb(z, y)) = πca(x, π c(1−a)
1−ac
(y, πb(z, y))
= πca(x, π 1−c
1−ac
(πb(z, y), y)






Where the first inequality follows from (A4), the second from (A2), the third from
(A3) and the fourth from (A4).
Proof of Lemma A.1.1
Part 1: If a = 0 or b = 1, then Mixture-Betweenness implies πb(x, y)  πa(x, y).
Suppose 0 < a < b < 1. Then, there exists c ∈ (0, 1) such that cb = a. By Mixture-
Betweenness, πb(x, y)  y. Further, Mixture-Betweenness also implies πb(x, y) 
πc(πb(x, y), y) = πa(x, y).
Part 2: Fix x, y, z ∈ M and let A = {a|πa(x, y)  z}. WLOG assume x  y.
If A = ∅ or a singleton, then there is nothing to prove. Assume A 6= ∅ and |A| > 1.
Define a∗ = inf A. If a∗ ∈ A, then by Part 1 A = [a∗, 1]. Hence, A is closed. As-
sume towards a contradiction that a∗ 6∈ A. Thus, z  πa∗(x, y). Since |A| > 1, then
x  z  πa∗(x, y). Hence, by Continuity, there exists b such that
z  πb(x, πa∗(x, y)) = π1−b(π(1−a∗)(y, x), x) = π(1−b)(1−a∗)(y, x) = π1−(1−b)(1−a∗)(x, y).
Note that 1 − (1 − b)(1 − a∗) = a∗ + b(1 − a∗) > a∗. Hence, z  π1−(1−b)(1−a∗)(x, y)
and 1− (1− b)(1− a∗) > a∗, a contradiction of the fact that a∗ is the infimum.
The proof that {a|z  πa(x, y)} is closed is analogous, the only difference is that
instead of using the infimum to derive a contradiction, one needs to use the supremum.
56
Part 3: Follows from Part 2.
Proof of Lemma A.1.2
The proofs of Parts 2, 4 and 6 are analogous to the proofs of Parts 1, 3 and 5 respec-
tively. Hence, we only prove Parts 1,3 and 5.
Part 1: Fix x, y such that V (x), V (y) ≥ γ and a ∈ (0, 1). Then, by Mixture-
Betweenness, V (πa(x, y)) ≥ γ. Further,
πλ(x,γ)(x, x) ∼ xγ ∼ πλ(y,γ)(y, x).
Hence, by Mixture-Betweenness, πc(πλ(x,γ)(x, x), πλ(y,γ)(y, x)) ∼ xγ ∀ c ∈ (0, 1). No-
tice that if for some c ∈ (0, 1)
πc(πλ(x,γ)(x, x), πλ(y,γ)(y, x)) = π λ(x,γ)λ(y,γ)
aλ(y,γ)+(1−a)λ(x,γ)
(πa(x, y), x)
=⇒ λ(πa(x, y), γ) =
λ(x, γ)λ(y, γ)
aλ(y, γ) + (1− a)λ(x, γ)
.
Thus, it is enough to show that the first equality holds.
By Lemma A.1.8, for all c ∈ [0, 1]
πc(πλ(x,γ)(x, x), πλ(y,γ)(y, x)) = πcλ(x,γ)+(1−c)λ(y,γ)(π cλ(x,γ)
cλ(x,γ)+(1−c)λ(y,γ)
(x, y), x).
In particular, if c = aλ(y,γ)
aλ(y,γ)+(1−a)λ(x,γ) , then
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cλ(x, γ) + (1− c)λ(y, γ) = aλ(y, γ)λ(x, γ)
aλ(y, γ) + (1− a)λ(x, γ)
+
(1− a)λ(x, γ)λ(y, γ)
aλ(y, γ) + (1− a)λ(x, γ)
=
λ(x, γ)λ(y, γ)
aλ(y, γ) + (1− a)λ(x, γ)
and
cλ(x, γ)









Hence, πc(πλ(x,γ)(x, x), πλ(y,γ)(y, x)) = π λ(x,γ)λ(y,γ)
aλ(y,γ)+(1−a)λ(x,γ)
(πa(x, y), x).
Part 3: Fix x, y, z ∈ X such that V (x), V (y) > γ > V (z) and λ(x, γ) < λ(y, γ).
Let b ∈ (0, 1) be such that
πb(x, z) ∼ xγ.
Then, by Part 1,
λ(πa(x, πb(x, z))) =
λ(x, γ)
a+ (1− a)λ(x, γ)
.
Define φ(a) = λ(x,γ)
a+(1−a)λ(x,γ) . Then, φ(0) = 1, φ(1) = λ(x) and φ
′(a) < 0 for all
a ∈ (0, 1). Hence, there exists a unique a ∈ (0, 1) such that φ(a) = λ(y, γ).
Part 5: Let a1 and a2 be such that
xγ ∼ πa1(x, z)
xγ ∼ πa2(y, z).
Assume towards a contradiction that a2 > a1 (the case in which a1 > a2 is analogous).
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Then, πa2(x, z)  xγ and λ(πa2(x, z), γ) < 1. Since λ(x, γ) = λ(y, γ), then by Part 1,
for all c ∈ (0, 1)
λ(πc(x, πa2(y, z)), γ) = λ(πc(y, πa1(x, z)), γ).
However,
πc(x, πa2(y, z) = π1−c(πa2(y, z), x)
= π(1−c)a2(y, π (1−c)(1−a2)
1−(1−c)a2
(z, x))
= π(1−c)a2(y, π c1−(1−c)a2
(x, z)).
Thus, for c = a2
1+a2
,









(y, πa2(x, z)), γ) = λ(π a2
1+a2
(y, πa1(x, z)), γ) implies
λ(y, γ)λ(πa2(x, z))
c+ (1− c)λ(y, γ)
=
λ(y, γ)
c+ (1− c)λ(y, γ)
λ(πa2(x, z)) = 1,
a contradiction.
A.1.5 Mixture Space Theorem for compact and convex sets
In this section we provide the version of Theorem 1.5.3 for the case in which the space
is a compact and convex subset of a linear space.
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Axioms and the Theorem
LetM be a compact and convex subset of a linear space and  a preference overM.
Consider the following three axioms on .
Weak Order  is complete and transitive.
Strong Continuity the sets {y|y  x} and {y|x  y} are closed for all x ∈M.
Mixture-Betweenness
x  y implies x  αx+ (1− α)y  y for all α ∈ (0, 1), and
x ∼ y implies x ∼ αx+ (1− α)y ∼ y for all α ∈ (0, 1).
Theorem A.1.1. Let  be a non-trivial binary relation over a compact and convex
subset of a linear space M. Then the following two statements are equivalent:
a)  satisfies Weak Order, Strong Continuity and Mixture-Betweenness.
b) There exists Φ :M× [0, 1]→ R such that
1.- Φ is continuous in its second on the interval (0, 1) and continuous in the
first.
2.- Φ is mixture linear in its first argument for all γ ∈ [0, 1].
3.- Φ(x, γ) = 1,Φ(x, γ) = 0 for all γ ∈ [0, 1] for some x, x ∈M.
4.- Φ(x, γ) = γ has a unique solution for all x ∈M.
5.-  can be represented by a continuous function V : M→ [0, 1], where for
each x ∈ X , V (x) is the unique γ ∈ [0, 1] that solves
γ = Φ(x, γ).
Further, if Φ and Φ′ represent , then there exist continuous functions a, b :
(0, 1)→ R such that a(γ) > 0 for all γ ∈ (0, 1),
φ(γ) = a(γ)γ + b(γ) is continuous and strictly increasing, and
Φ′(., φ(γ)) = a(γ)Φ(., γ) + b(γ) for all γ ∈ (0, 1).
60
Proof of Theorem A.1.1
Necessity of the axioms can be verified using identical arguments to the ones in the
proof of Theorem 1.5.3. Hence, we only show sufficiency and the claim about the
uniqueness properties of the representation.
Sufficiency
Since M is compact and  is a non-trivial binary relation that satisfies Weak Order
and Continuity, then there exist x, x such that x  x and x  x  x for all x ∈M.
Construct V and Φ :M× (0, 1)→ R as in the proof of Theorem 1.5.3. Then, by
the arguments in Section A.1.1, they are well defined, V represents , Φ is contin-
uous in its second argument and mixture-linear in the first, and for all x such that
x  x  x, V (x) = γ if and only if Φ(x, γ) = γ. Hence, we only need to show that V
and Φ(., γ) are continuous and, construct Φ(., 1) and Φ(0, 1).
Step 1: Show V is continuous
Fix x and xn such that xn → x. Assume, towards a contradiction that V (xn) 6→
V (x). Then, there exists a neighborhood B(V (x)) of V (x) such that V (xn) 6∈ B(V (x))
for infinitely many n. Let xm denote the corresponding subsequence of xn. Since
xn → x, then xm → x. Since V (xm) is a subsequence in [0, 1], there exists a
convergent subsequence V (xl) with limit V 6= V (x). However, since xl → x and
xl ∼ V (xl)x + (1 − V (xl))x, Strong Continuity implies x ∼ V x + (1 − V )x. Since
V (x) is unique, V (x) = V , a contradiction.
Step 2: Show that Φ(., γ) is continuous
It is enough to show that λ(., γ) is continuous. Fix x and xn → x, then there are
three cases: (i) V (x) > γ. (ii) V (x) < γ. (iii) V (x) = γ. The proofs of (ii) and (iii)
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are analogous to the proof of (i). Hence, we only show the latter.
Assume V (x) > γ. By standard arguments, it is WLOG to assume V (xn) > γ for
all n. Hence, λ(xn, γ) is the unique scalar such that λ(xn, γ)xn+(1−λ(xn, γ))x) ∼ xγ.
Assume towards a contradiction that λ(xn, γ) 6→ λ(x, γ). Then, there exists a neigh-
borhood B(λ(x, γ)) of λ(x, γ) such that λ(xn, γ) 6∈ B(λ(x, γ)) for infinitely many n.
Let xm denote the corresponding subsequence of xn. Since xn → x, then xm → x.
Since λ(xn, γ) is a subsequence in [0, 1], there exists a convergent subsequence λ(xl, γ)
with limit λ 6= λ(x, γ). However, since xl → x and λ(xl, γ)xl + (1 − λ(xl, γ))x ∼
γx+ (1−γ)x, Strong Continuity implies λx+ (1−λ)x ∼ γx+ (1−γ)x. Since λ(x, γ)
is unique, λ(x, γ) = λ, a contradiction.
Step 3: Construct Φ(., 1) and Φ(., 0)
The construction of Φ(., 1) and Φ(., 0) are analogous. Hence, we only show the
construction of Φ(., 1) which is almost identical to the construction of the u function
in the proof of Proposition 1 in Mongin (2001).
Let Mx,x = {z ∈ M|∃x ∼ x, α ∈ [0, 1] : z = αx + (1 − α)x}. Then, Mx,x
is convex. Define Φ(x, 1) = 1 for all x such that x ∼ x, Φ(x, 1) = 0, and for any
z = αx + (1 − α)x and x ∼ x define Φ(z, 1) = α. Since M is a convex subset of a
linear space, this function is well defined.
Suppose that Φ(., 1) has been extended from Mx,x to a convex set N such that
N ⊆ M in such a way that Φ(., 1) is mixture-linear and Φ(z, 1) < 1 for all z ∈
N\Mx,x. Suppose there exists x ∈M\N . Define
Nx = {z ∈M|∃α ∈ [0, 1], y ∈ N : z = αx+ (1− α)y}.
Then, Nx is convex. Define Φ(x, 1) = 0, and for any z = αx + (1 − α)y define
Φ(z, 1) = (1−α)Φ(y, 1). To see that Φ(., 1) is well defined note that if z = αx+ (1−
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α)y = βx + (1 − β)y′ for some y, y′ ∈ N , then because M is a convex subset of a





)x+ (1− β − α
1− α
)y′.
Hence, Φ(z, 1) is the same whichever of the two decompositions is chosen. Further,
Φ(., 1) is mixture linear on Nx. Hence, Φ(., 1) can be extended to Nx in such a way
that it is mixture-linear and Φ(z, 1) < 1 for all z ∈ Nx.
Consider all the convex subsets S ofM such thatMx,x ⊂ S and Φ(., 1) has been
extended to S in such a way that Φ(z, 1) < 1 for all z 6∈ Mx,x. Partially order the
set P of pairs (S,ΦS(., 1)) in the following way:
(S,ΦS(., 1)) ≤ (S ′,ΦS′(., 1)) iff S ⊆ S ′ and ΦS′(., 1) extends ΦS(., 1).
Take any totally ordered chain of P , (Si,ΦSi(., 1))i∈I . It has an upperbound
(∪i∈I , Si,Φ∗(., 1))
with Φ∗(., 1) defined by: Φ∗(x, 1) = ΦSi(x, 1) if x ∈ Si. Thus, by Zorn’s Lemma P
has a maximal element for ≥. Denote it by (S∗,Φ∗(., 1)). Suppose M 6= S∗. Then
we can take x ∈M\S∗, construct Nx as in the second part of the construction to get
(T,ΦT (., 1)) such that S
∗ ⊆ T and ΦT (., 1) extends Φ∗(., 1). Hence, (S∗,Φ∗(., 1)) ≤
(T,ΦT (., 1)) and T 6= S∗, a contradiction. Hence, S∗ = M and Φ∗(., 1) extends
Φ(., 1). Thus, Φ∗(x, 1) = 1 if and only if x ∼ x.
Uniqueness
Necessity
Assume Φ and Φ′ represent and let x, x, x′, x′ be such that Φ(x, γ) = 1,Φ(x, γ) =
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0, Φ′(x′, γ) = 1,Φ′(x′, γ) = 0. Then,
V (αx+ (1− α)x) = α
V ′(αx′ + (1− α)x′) = α
for all α ∈ [0, 1]. Hence V (x) and V ′(x) are the unique scalars α, β ∈ [0, 1] such that
x ∼ αx+ (1− α)x and x ∼ βx′ + (1− β)x′ respectively.
Let φ(γ) be the unique α ∈ [0, 1] such that
αx′ + (1− α)x′ ∼ γx+ (1− γ)x.
Then, φ is continuous and strictly increasing. Let γ,′φ(γ) be the preference repre-
sented by Φ(., γ) and Φ′(., φ(γ)) respectively. We claim that γ=′φ(γ). To see this,
note that
{x|x ∼φ(γ) φ(γ)x′ + (1− φ(γ))x′} = {x|x ∼γ γx+ (1− γ)x)}.
Hence,
{x|x ∼φ(γ) γx+ (1− γ)x} = {x|x ∼γ γx+ (1− γ)x}.
Further, by Lemma A.1.6, x γ γx+(1−γ)x γ x and x φ(γ) γx+(1−γ)x) φ(γ) x.
Thus, by Lemma A.1.7, γ=′φ(γ). Hence, by the Mixture Space Theorem, there
exists a, b : (0, 1) → R such that a(γ) > 0 and Φ′(., φ(γ)) = a(γ)Φ(., γ) + b(γ).
Further,
φ(γ) = Φ′(γx+ (1− γ)x, φ(γ))
= a(γ)Φ(γx+ (1− γ)x, γ) + b(γ)
= a(γ)γ + b(γ).
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Finally, note that a, b are continuous because φ, Φ′ and Φ are continuous.
Sufficiency
Assume V (x) ≥ V (y). Then,
V (x) = Φ(x, V (x))
V (y) = Φ(y, V (y))
=⇒ Φ
′(x, φ(V (x))) = a(V (x))Φ(x, V (x)) + b(x) = φ(V (x))
Φ′(y, φ(V (y))) = a(V (y))Φ(y, V (y)) + b(y) = φ(V (y)).
Since φ increasing, then φ(V (x)) ≥ φ(V (y)). Hence, V ′(x) ≥ V ′(y).
A.2 Proofs for Section 1.3
Preliminaries
∆(X) compact implies X is compact (Aliprantis and Border 1999, Theorem 3.71(3)).
Let K(∆(X)) denote the set of all closed and convex menus of lotteries. By the
Blaschke Selection Theorem, K(∆(X)) is compact.
Lemma A.2.1. K(∆(X)) is an associative mixture space.
Proof. By Lemmas S.2 and S.3 in Dekel et al. (2007), there exists a bijection from
K(∆(X)) to a convex subset of a linear space. Further, the bijection is mixture
preserving. Hence, by Theorem 1.5.2, K(∆(X)) is an Associative Mixture Space.
We conclude the preliminaries by introducing some notation. Let p, p ∈ ∆(X) denote
a fixed pair of lotteries such that {p}  x  {p} for all x ∈ X . Given our axioms,
such lotteries always exist (see footnote 4). Further, for each γ ∈ (0, 1), let {pγ}
denote γ{p}+ (1− γ){p}.
A.2.1 Sufficiency
Define V and Φ as in the proof of Theorem 1.5.3 using {p} and {p} as the best and
worst elements. Then, Φ(., γ) is mixture linear for all γ ∈ (0, 1) and, Φ({p}, γ) = 1
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and Φ({p}, γ) = 0 for all γ ∈ [0, 1]. Further, for all x such that {p}  x  {p},
V (x) = γ is the unique solution of
γ = Φ(x, γ).
An identical argument to the one in the proof of Theorem A.1.1 shows that Φ(., γ)
and V are continuous for all γ ∈ (0, 1). In what follows we will use Φ(., γ) to construct
the representation in Theorem 1.3.1 for the case in which γ ∈ (0, 1). Afterwards we
construct the representation for the case in which γ = 1 and γ = 0.
Step 1: Extend V and Φ(., γ) to X .
For each menu x ∈ X , let ch(x) denote its convex hull. Extend V by letting
V (x) = V (ch(x)) for all x ∈ X\K(∆(X)). We claim that V represents . To prove
this, it is enough to show that our axioms imply x ∼ ch(x) for all x ∈ X .
Lemma A.2.2. Let  be a binary relation over X that satisfies Weak Order, Conti-
nuity and Mixture-Betweenness. Then x ∼ ch(x) for all x ∈ X .
Proof. Let K = |X| and assume, by way of contradiction, that there exists x such
that x 6∼ ch(x). Then, by Mixture-Betweenness, αx + (1 − α)ch(x) 6∼ ch(x) for all
α ∈ (0, 1). This is a contradiction. In particular, Lemma S.6 in the supplemental




Extend Φ by letting Φ(x, γ) = Φ(ch(x), γ) for all x ∈ X\K(∆(X)). Then,
Φ(αx+ (1− α)y, γ) = Φ(ch(αx+ (1− α)y), γ)
= Φ(αch(x) + (1− α)ch(y), γ)
= αΦ(ch(x), γ) + (1− α)Φ(ch(y), γ)
= αΦ(x, γ) + (1− α)Φ(y, γ)
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for all x, y ∈ X and α ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, the extension of Φ is also mixture linear in its
first argument and continuous in its second.
Finally, continuity of Φ(., γ) and V on X follows from the fact that for all x, y ∈ X ,
dh(ch(x), ch(y)) ≤ dh(x, y).
Step 2: Show that Φ(., γ) satisfies Set-Betwenness.
Fix x, y ∈ X and γ ∈ (0, 1). Assume WLOG that Φ(x, γ) ≥ Φ(y, γ). There are
three possible cases:
(i) Φ(x, γ) ≥ Φ(y, γ) ≥ γ. (ii) Φ(x, γ) ≥ γ ≥ Φ(y, γ). (iii) γ ≥ Φ(x, γ) ≥ Φ(y, γ).
Since the proofs of (i) and (iii) are analogous, we only consider (i) and (ii).
(i) Φ(x, γ) ≥ Φ(y, γ) ≥ γ.
By Lemma A.1.6, V (x), V (y) ≥ γ. Thus, by Set-Betweenness, V (x ∪ y) ≥ γ. By
construction, Φ(x, γ) ≥ Φ(y, γ) if and only if λ(x, γ) ≤ λ(y, γ) so
λ(x, γ)x+ (1− λ(x, γ)){p} ∼ {pγ}  λ(x, γ)y + (1− λ(x, γ)){p}.
Hence, by Set-Betweenness,
λ(x, γ)x+ (1− λ(x, γ)){p}
λ(x, γ)x+ (1− λ(x, γ)){p} ∪ λ(x, γ)y + (1− λ(x, γ)){p}
λ(x, γ)y + (1− λ(x, γ)){p}.
However,
λ(x, γ)x+ (1− λ(x, γ)){p} ∪ λ(x, γ)y + (1− λ(x, γ)){p}
=λ(x, γ)(x ∪ y) + (1− λ(x, γ)){p}.
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Thus,
{pγ}  λ(x, γ)(x ∪ y) + (1− λ(x, γ)){p}.
Hence, λ(x ∪ y, γ) ≥ λ(x, γ) so Φ(x, γ) ≥ Φ(x ∪ y, γ).
A similar argument shows that Φ(x ∪ y, γ) ≥ Φ(y, γ), the only difference is that
one needs to use y (λ(y, γ)) instead of x (λ(x, γ)).
(ii) Φ(x, γ) ≥ γ ≥ Φ(y, γ).
By Lemma A.1.6, V (x) ≥ γ ≥ V (y). Hence, by Set-Betweenness,
V (x) ≥ V (x ∪ y) ≥ V (y). There are two cases: V (x ∪ y) ≥ γ or γ ≥ V (x ∪ y).
If V (x ∪ y) ≥ γ, then, by Lemma A.1.6, Φ(x ∪ y, γ) ≥ Φ(y, γ). Hence, we only
need to show Φ(x, γ) ≥ Φ(x ∪ y, γ). By Mixture-Betweenness,
λ(x, γ)x+ (1− λ(x, γ)){p} ∼ {pγ}  λ(x, γ)y + (1− λ(x, γ)){p}.
Thus, by Set-Betweenness,
λ(x, γ)x+ (1− λ(x, γ)){p}
λ(x, γ)x+ (1− λ(x, γ)){p} ∪ λ(x, γ)y + (1− λ(x, γ)){p}
λ(x, γ)y + (1− λ(x, γ)){p}.
However,
λ(x, γ)x+ (1− λ(x, γ)){p} ∪ λ(x, γ)y + (1− λ(x, γ)){p}
=λ(x, γ)x ∪ y + (1− λ(x, γ)){p}.
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Therefore,
λ(x, γ)x+ (1− λ(x, γ)){p}
λ(x, γ)x ∪ y + (1− λ(x, γ)){p}
 λ(x, γ)y + (1− λ(x, γ)){p}.
Hence, λ(x ∪ y, γ) ≥ λ(x, γ) so Φ(x, γ) ≥ Φ(x ∪ y, γ).
A similar argument establishes that if γ ≥ V (x ∪ y), then Φ(x, γ) ≥ Φ(x ∪
y, γ) ≥ Φ(y, γ). The only difference is that if γ ≥ V (x ∪ y), then, by Lemma A.1.6,
Φ(x, γ) ≥ Φ(x ∪ y, γ). Therefore, one only needs to show that Φ(x ∪ y, γ) ≥ Φ(y, γ).
An analogous argument to the previous one in which λ(x, γ) is replaced by λ(y, γ)
proves that Φ(x ∪ y, γ) ≥ Φ(y, γ).
Step 3: Show that there exists u(., γ) and v(., γ) such that for all γ ∈ (0, 1)
and x ∈ X ,
Φ(x, γ) = max
p∈x
{u(p, γ) + v(p, γ)−max
q∈x
v(q, γ)}.
Restrict  to ∆(X), then by Proposition 1 in Dekel (1986) there exists a unique
u : ∆(X)× (0, 1)→ R such that u(., γ) is a vNM utility function for all γ ∈ [0, 1], u is
continuous in its second argument on the open interval (0, 1), u(p, γ) = 1, u(p, γ) = 0
and V ({p}) is the unique γ ∈ [0, 1] that solves
γ = u(p, γ).
Hence, Φ({p}, γ) = u(p, γ) for all p ∈ ∆(X) and γ ∈ (0, 1).
By Lemmas 2, 4 and 5 in Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), there exists a vNM function
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v(., γ) such that
Φ(x, γ) = max
p∈x
{u(p, γ) + v(p, γ)−max
q∈x
v(q, γ)}
for all x ∈ X .
Step 4: Construct v(., 1) and v(., 0).
The construction of v(., 0) and v(., 1) are analogous. Thus, we only show the
latter and specify how to adapt the argument for the former.Since  satisfies Set-
Betweenness, we will restrict our attention to binary menus. Our construction of
v(., 1) is similar to the construction in the proof of Theorem 2 in Noor and Takeoka
(2015).
Let P = {p|{p}  {q} for all q}. There are two possible cases: (i) {p} ∼ {p, q} for
all p ∈ P , q ∈ ∆(X) and (ii) there exist p ∈ P and q ∈ ∆(X) such that {p}  {p, q}.
(i) {p} ∼ {p, q} for all p ∈ P , q ∈ ∆(X)
Let v(., 1) = 0. Then, max
p∈{p,q}
u(p, 1) = 1 if and only if p ∈ P or q ∈ P . Hence,
max
p′∈{p,q}
u(p′, 1) if and only if V ({p, q}) = 1.
(ii) There exist p ∈ P and q ∈ ∆(X) such that {p}  {p, q}
Define T over ∆(X) as follows
p T q if and only if {p} ∼ {p, q}  {q} and p ∈ P
q T p if and only if {p}  {p, q} and p ∈ P .
We will show that there exists a vNM utility function v(., 1) such that p T q





{u(p′, 1) + v(p′, 1)− max
q′∈{p,q}
v(q′, 1)} if and only if V ({p, q}) = 1.
To prove this, let Φ(x, 1) = max
p∈x
{u(p, 1) + v(p, 1) − max
q∈x
v(q, 1)}. First, assume
V ({p, q}) = 1. If {p}, {q} ∼ {p}, then u(p, 1) = u(q, 1) = 1. Thus Φ({p, q}, 1) must
be equal to 1 because Φ({p}, 1) = Φ({q}, 1) and Φ(., 1) satisfies Set-Betweenness.
If {p} ∼ {p}  {q}, then {p, q}  {q}. Hence, by construction, v(q, 1) ≥ v(p, 1).
Thus, Φ({p, q}, 1) = u(p, 1) = 1. Finally, note that if {p}  {p}, {q}, then, by
Set-Betweenness, V ({p, q}) < 1.
Next, assume 1 = Φ({p, q}, 1). Since v(p′, 1)− max
q′∈{p,q}
v(q′, 1) ≤ 0 and u(p, 1) ≤ 1,
then 1 = Φ({p, q}, 1) implies that p ∈ P or q ∈ P . If p, q ∈ P , then V ({p}) =
V ({q}) = 1 so by Set-Betweenness V ({p, q}) = 1. Assume towards a contradiction
that p ∈ P , q 6∈ P and V ({p, q}) < 1. Then, q T p so v(q, 1) > v(p, 1). Further,
p ∈ P implies u(p, 1) = 1. Hence, Φ({p, q}, 1) < 1 a contradiction.
Finally, we will show that such vNM utility function exists.
Let 0 denote the zero vector and T = cl(ch({λ(p − q)|λ > 0, p  q or p T q}).
By Lemma 2 in Fishburn (1975), there exists v(., 1) such that p T q implies
v(p, 1) > v(q, 1) and p T q implies v(p, 1) ≥ v(q, 1) if 0 6∈ T . We prove this in
three steps.
Step 4.1: Show that if {pt} ∼ {pt, qt} for t = 1, ..., n and pt ∈ P for all t, then
{
∑n




t λtqt} for all λ ∈ ∆({1, ..., n}).
The proof is by induction:
Base case: Fix p1, p2 ∈ P such that {p1} ∼ {p1, q1} and {p2} ∼ {p2, q2}. By
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Mixture-Betweenness, {λp1 + (1 − λ)p2}  x for all x ∈ X . Assume towards a
contradiction that {λp1 + (1− λ)p2}  {λp1 + (1− λ)p2, λq1 + (1− λ)q2}.
By Mixture-Betweenness,
{p2, q2}  {λq1 + (1− λ)p2, λq1 + (1− λ)q2}
{p1, q1}  {λp1 + (1− λ)q2, λq1 + (1− λ)q2}.
Thus, by Set-Betweenness,
{p2, q2}  {λq1 + (1− λ)p2, λq1 + (1− λ)q2, λp1 + (1− λ)q2}.
Assume WLOG that
{λq1 + (1− λ)p2, λq1 + (1− λ)q2, λp1 + (1− λ)q2}
{λp1 + (1− λ)p2, λq1 + (1− λ)q2}.
Thus, By Set-Betweenness,
{p2, q2}  {λq1 + (1− λ)p2, λq1 + (1− λ)q2, λp1 + (1− λ)q2, λp1 + (1− λ)p2}.
However,
{λq1 + (1− λ)p2, λq1 + (1− λ)q2, λp1 + (1− λ)q2, λp1 + (1− λ)p2}
=λ{p1, q1}+ (1− λ){p2, q2},
a contradiction.
Induction step: Suppose the result is true for n. We will now show it holds for
n+ 1.

















qt}. Hence, by the base case,
{
∑n+1





Step 4.2: Show that if {pt}  {pt, qt} t = 1, ..., n and pt ∈ P for all t, then
{
∑n





The proof is by induction.
Base case: Fix p1, p2 ∈ P such that {p1}  {p1, q1} and {p2}  {p2, q2}. By
Mixture-Betweenness, {λp1 + (1−λ)p2}  {λp1 + (1−λ)p2, λq1 + (1−λ)q2}. Assume
towards a contradiction that {λp1 + (1− λ)p2} ∼ {λp1 + (1− λ)p2, λq1 + (1− λ)q2}.
First note that if
{λp1 + (1− λ)p2, q2} ∼ {p2},
then by the previous step,
{λp1 + (1− λ)p2, λp1 + (1− λ)q2} ∼ {p2}.
However
{λp1 + (1− λ)p2, λp1 + (1− λ)q2} = λ{p1}+ (1− λ){p2, q2} ≺ {p2},
a contradiction. An identical argument shows that Similarly, if
{p1}  {λp1 + (1− λ)p2, q1}.
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Hence,
{λp1 + (1− λ)p2}  {λp1 + (1− λ)p2, q1}, {λp1 + (1− λ)p2}  {λp1 + (1− λ)p2, q2}
and {λp1 + (1− λ)p2} ∼ {λp1 + (1− λ)p2, q2}.
Let p = λp1 + (1− λ)p2. By continuity, there exists α > λ > β such that
{p}  {p, αq1 + (1− α)q2} ∼ {p, βq1 + (1− β)q2}.
Let ν be such that
ν(αq1 + (1− α)q2) + (1− ν)(βq1 + (1− β)q2) = λq1 + (1− λ)q2.
Then, by Mixture-Betweenness,
{p, αq1 + (1− α)q2} ∼ ν{p, αq1 + (1− α)q2}+ (1− ν){p, βq1 + (1− β)q2}
∼ {p, βq1 + (1− β)q2}.
However,
ν{p, αq1 + (1− α)q2}+ (1− ν){p, βq1 + (1− β)q2}
={p, λq1 + (1− λ)q2, νp+ (1− ν)(βq1 + (1− β)q2), ν(αq1 + (1− α)q2) + (1− ν)p}
={p, λq1 + (1− λ)q2} ∪ [ν{p}+ (1− ν){p, βq1 + (1− β)q2}]
∪ [(1− ν){p}+ ν{p, αq1 + (1− α)q2}].
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Notice that
{p, λq1 + (1− λ)q2}  {p, αq1 + (1− α)q2}
ν{p}+ (1− ν){p, βq1 + (1− β)q2}  {p, βq1 + (1− β)q2}
(1− ν){p}+ ν{p, αq1 + (1− α)q2}  {p, αq1 + (1− α)q2}
So by Set-Betweenness,
ν{p, αq1 + (1− α)q2}+ (1− ν){p, βq1 + (1− β)q2}  {p, αq1 + (1− α)q2}
∼ {p, βq1 + (1− β)q2},
a contradiction.
Induction step: Suppose the result is true for n. We will show it is true for n+ 1.
















qt}. Hence, by the base case,
{
∑





Step 4.3: show that 0 6∈ T .
We only show that 0 6∈ int(T ) because Continuity implies that if 0 6∈ int(T ), then
0 6∈ T .

















































. Then, λ∗p+ (1− λ∗)q′ = λ∗q + (1− λ∗)p′.
Note that by steps 4.1 and 4.2, {p} ∼ {p, q} and {p′}  {p′, q′}. Hence, by Mixture-
Betweenness,
{λ∗p+ (1− λ∗)p′}  λ∗{p}+ (1− λ∗){p′, q′}
= {λ∗p+ (1− λ∗)p′, λ∗p+ (1− λ∗)q′}
= {λ∗p+ (1− λ∗)p′, λ∗q + (1− λ∗)p′}
= λ∗{p, q}+ (1− λ∗){p′} ∼ {λ∗p+ (1− λ∗)p′}
a contradiction.
To conclude the proof we outline the construction of v(., 0). Let Q = {q ∈
∆(X)|{p}  {q} for all p ∈ ∆(X)}. There are two possible cases: (i) {p, q} ∼ {q}
for all p ∈ ∆(X) and q ∈ Q, and (ii) there exist p ∈ ∆(X) and q ∈ Q such that
{p, q}  {q}.
(i) {p, q} ∼ {q} for all p ∈ ∆(X) and q ∈ Q
Let v(., 0) = −u(., 0). Then,
max
p′∈{p,q}
{u(p′, 0) + v(p′, 0)− max
q′∈{p,q}







u(p′, 0) = 0 ⇐⇒ p ∈ Q or q ∈ Q ⇐⇒ V (x) = 0.
(ii) there exist p ∈ ∆(X) and q ∈ Q such that {p, q}  {q}
Define T over ∆(X) as follows:
q T p if and only if {p}  {p, q} ∼ {q} and q ∈ Q
p T q if and only if {p, q}  {q} and q ∈ Q.
An identical argument to the one in the construction of v(., 1) shows there exists v′
such that p T q implies v′(p) ≥ v′(q), p T q implies v′(p) > v(q). Let v(., 0) =
−u(., 0) + v′, we will now show that
0 = max
p∈x
{u(p, 0) + v(p, 0)−max
q∈x
v(q, 0)} if and only if V (x) = 0. (A.2)
To prove this, let Φ(x, 0) = max
p∈x
{u(p, 0) + v(p, 0) − max
q∈x
v(q, 0)}. First, assume
V ({p, q}) = 0: If {p}, {q} ∈ Q, then u(p, 0) = u(q, 0) = 0. Thus, by Set-Betweenness,
Φ({p, q}, 0) = 0. If q ∈ Q and {p}  {p, q} ∼ {q}, then, −u(q, 0) > −u(p, 0) and
v(q, 0) ≥ v(p, 0). Thus, Φ({p, q}) is equal to
v′(q)− v′(q) + u(q, 0) = u(q, 0) = 0.
Hence, Φ({p, q}, 0) = 0. Finally, note that if p, q 6∈ Q, then V ({p, q}) > 0.
Next, assume towards a contradiction that Φ({p, q}, 0) = 0 and V ({p, q}) > 0. If
p, q 6∈ Q, then u(p, 0) > 0 and u(q, 0) > 0. Hence, by Set-Betweenness, Φ({p, q}, 0) >
0. Hence, either p ∈ Q or q ∈ Q. If p, q ∈ Q, then V ({p}) = V ({q}) = 0. Hence,
by Set-Betweenness, V ({p, q}) = 0 a contradiction. If q ∈ Q and p 6∈ Q, then
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V ({p, q}) > 0 implies v′(p) > v′(q). Hence, Φ({p, q}, 0) is equal to either
v′(p)− v′(q) or u(p, 0).
Either way, Φ({p, q}, 0) 6= 0, a contradiction.
A.2.2 Necessity
The proof of necessity of Weak Order and Hausdorff Continuity is routine. Further,
the proof of necessity of Mixture-Betwenness is identical to to the proof given in
Section A.1.2. Hence, we only show that the representation satisfies Set-Betweenness.
Assume (u, v) represent , then for any menu z ∈ X , V (z) = V ({pz, qz}) for any
pz, qz ∈ z such that
pz ∈ arg max
p∈z
{u(p, V (z)) + v(p, V (z))}
qz ∈ arg max
q∈z
v(q, V (z)).
To see this, note that
V (z) = max
p∈z





{u(p, V (z)) + v(p, V (z))− max
q∈{pz ,qz}
{v(q, V (z))}}.
Hence, by the unique solution property, V (z) = V ({pz, qz}).
Fix x, y such that V (x) ≥ V (y) and
pz ∈ arg max
p∈z
{u(p, V (z)) + v(p, V (z))}
qz ∈ arg max
q∈z
v(q, V (z))
for z ∈ {x, y, x∪ y}. Then, V (z) = V ({pz, qz}) for all z ∈ {x, y, x∪ y}. We will show
that V ({px, qx}) ≥ V ({px∪y, qx∪y}) ≥ V ({py, qy}).
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Note that for z = x ∪ y, pz and qz can be either in x or in y. Hence, there are 4
possible cases: (i) px∪y, qx∪y ∈ x. (ii) px∪y, qx∪y ∈ y. (iii) px∪y ∈ x\y, qx∪y ∈ y\x. (iv)
px∪y ∈ y\x, qx∪y ∈ x\y.
If px∪y, qx∪y ∈ x, then V (x) = V (x∪y) and if px∪y, qx∪y ∈ y, then V (x∪y) = V (y).
Hence we only consider cases (iii) and (iv).
(iii) px∪y ∈ x\y, qx∪y ∈ y\x.
First note that
qx∪y ∈ arg max
q∈x∪y
v(q, V (x ∪ y)) and qx∪y ∈ y
=⇒ v(qx, V (x ∪ y)), v(px∪y, V (x ∪ y)) ≤ v(qx∪y, V (x ∪ y))
Thus,




{u(p, V (x ∪ y)) + v(p, V (x ∪ y))} − max
q∈{px∪y ,qx}
v(q, V (x ∪ y)) ≥ V (x ∪ y).
Thus, by Lemma A.1.6, V ({px∪y, qx}) ≥ V ({px∪y, qx∪y}). Moreover,
u(px, V (x)) + v(px, V (x)) ≥ u(px∪y, V (x)) + v(px∪y, V (x)).
Hence,
V (x) ≥ u(px∪y, V (x)) + v(px∪y, V (x))− v(qx, V (x)).
Thus, by Lemma A.1.6, V ({px, qx}) ≥ V ({px∪y, qx}). Hence,
V ({px, qx}) ≥ V ({px∪y, qx∪y}). To see that V ({px∪y, qx∪y}) ≥ V ({py, qy}) note that
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px∪y ∈ x implies that
V (x ∪ y) ≥ u(py, V (x ∪ y)) + v(py,V (x ∪ y))− v(qx∪y, V (x ∪ y))
and
V (x ∪ y) ≥ u(qx∪y, V (x ∪ y)) + v(qx∪y,V (x ∪ y))− v(qx∪y, V (x ∪ y)).
Hence,
V (x ∪ y) ≥ max
p∈{py ,qx∪y}
{u(p, V (x ∪ y)) + v(p, V (x ∪ y))} − max
q∈{py ,qx∪y}
v(q, V (x ∪ y)).
Thus, by Lemma A.1.6, V ({px∪y, qx∪y}) ≥ V ({py, qx∪y}). Finally, since qx∪y ∈ y, then
u(py, V (y)) + v(py, V (y))− v(qx∪y, V (y)) ≥ V (y).
Hence, by Lemma A.1.6, V ({py, qx∪y}) ≥ V ({py, qy}).
(iv) px∪y ∈ y\x, qx∪y ∈ x\y.
First note that
V (y) ≥ u(px∪y, V (y)) + v(px∪y, V (y))− v(qy, V (y))
and
V (y) ≥ u(qy, V (y)) + v(qy, V (y))− v(qy, V (y)).
Hence,
V (y) ≥ max
p∈{px∪y ,qy}




Thus, by Lemma A.1.6, V (py, qy) ≥ V ({px∪y, qy}). Next, note that
qx∪y ∈ arg max
q∈x∪y
{v(q, V (x ∪ y))}
=⇒ V (x ∪ y) ≤ u(px∪y, V (x ∪ y)) + v(px∪y, V (x ∪ y))− v(qy, V (x ∪ y))
Hence,
V (x ∪ y)
≤ max
p∈{px∪y ,qy}
{u(px∪y, V (x ∪ y)) + v(px∪y, V (x ∪ y))} − max
q∈{px∪y ,qy}
v(px∪y, V (x ∪ y))
Thus, by Lemma A.1.6, V ({px∪y, qy}) ≥ V ({px∪y, qx∪y}). However,
V (x ∪ y) ≥ u(px, V (x ∪ y)) + v(px, V (x ∪ y))− v(qx∪y, V (x ∪ y)).
Thus, by Lemma A.1.6, V ({px∪y, qx∪y}) ≥ V ({px, qx∪y}). Moreover,
V (x) ≤ u(px, γ + v(px, V (x))− v(qx∪y, V (x)).
Hence,
V (x) ≤ max
p∈{px,qx∪y}
{u(p, V (x)) + v(p, V (x))} − max
q∈{px,qx∪y}
v(q, V (x)).
Thus, by Lemma A.1.6, V ({px, qx}) ≤ V ({px, qx∪y}). Hence,
V ({px, qx}) ≥ V ({py, qy}) ≥ V ({px∪y, qy})
≥ V ({px∪y, qx∪y}) ≥ V ({px, qx∪y})
≥ V ({px, qx})
Thus, V (x) = V (y) = V (x ∪ y).
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A.2.3 Uniqueness
Sufficiency is given in the text. Here we prove necessity.
Assume (u, v) and (u′, v′) represent . Fix γ ∈ (0, 1) and let
Φ(x, γ) = max
p∈x
{u(p, γ) + v(p, γ)−max
q∈x
{v(q, γ)}}
Φ′(x, γ) = max
p∈x
{u(p, γ) + v′(p, γ)−max
q∈x
{v′(q, γ)}}.
By an identical argument to the one in the uniqueness part of Theorem 1.5.3,
Φ(x, γ) = Φ′(x, γ) for all x ∈ K(∆(X)) and γ ∈ (0, 1). In particular, Φ({p}, γ) =
Φ′({p}, γ) for all p ∈ ∆(X) and γ ∈ (0, 1). Hence, u = u′. Denote γ and γ′ the
preference over menus represented by Φ(., γ) and Φ′(., γ) respectively. Fix γ ∈ (0, 1).
If v(., γ) is a constant or a positive affine transformation of u(., γ). Then,
Φ(x, γ) = max
p∈x
{u(p, γ)}
for all x ∈ X. Hence, for all x there exists p ∈ x such that x ∼γ {p}. Thus, by GP
(p. 1414), either v′(., γ) is a constant or a positive affine transformation of u(., γ).
If v(., γ) is not a constant or a positive affine transformation of u(., γ). Then,
by GP (p.1414), there are two cases: either there exist p, q such that Φ({p}, γ) >
Φ({p, q}, γ) > Φ({q}, γ) or Φ({p}, γ) > Φ({p, q}, γ) = Φ({q}, γ) for all p, q such
that Φ({p}, γ) > Φ({q}, γ). If there exist p, q such that Φ({p}, γ) > Φ({p, q}, γ) >
Φ({q}, γ), then since u(., γ) is unique, by GP’s Theorem 4, v′(., γ) = v(., γ) + bγ. If
Φ({p}, γ) > Φ({p, q}, γ) = Φ({q}, γ) for all p, q such that Φ({p}, γ) > Φ({q}, γ), then
by GP (p.1414), v(., γ) is a negative affine transformation of u(., γ). Hence, we only
need to rule out the case in which v(., γ) = −aγu(., γ) + bγ and aγ ∈ (0, 1). To see
that this is impossible let pγ be such that γ = u(pγ, γ). Then, u(p, γ) = 1 > u(pγ, γ).
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Hence, Φ({pγ, p}, γ) = γ. However, if aγ < 1, then
u(p, γ)− aγu(p, γ) = 1− aγ > u(pγ, γ)− aγu(pγ, γ) = γ − aγγ.
Hence,
Φ({pγ, p}, γ) = 1− aγ + aγγ 6= γ.
Therefore, aγ ≥ 1.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1.3.1
Necessity is straightforward. Here we prove sufficiency. Recall that for any p ∈ ∆(X),
V ({p}) is the unique scalar γ such that
{p} ∼ γ{p}+ (1− γ){p}.
Fix γ ∈ (0, 1) and let γ be the preference over lotteries represented by u(., γ).
Note that {{p}|{p} ∼γ γ{p} + (1 − γ){p}} = {{p}|{p} ∼ γ{p} + (1 − γ){p}}.
Further, u(p, γ) = 1 > u(p, γ) = 0. Hence, by Lemma A.1.7, for the restriction
of  to singleton menus, γ= for all γ ∈ (0, 1). By the vNM Expected Utility
Theorem, there exists a unique expected utility function u∗ such that u∗ represents
the restriction of  to singleton menus, u∗(p) = 1 and u∗(p) = 0. Hence u∗ = u(., γ)
for all γ ∈ (0, 1). Finally, by continuity, u(., 1) = u(., 0) = u∗.
A.4 Details for Section 1.3.3
First we show that the special case of the model considered in Section 3.3 satisfies
Mixture-Increasing Preference for Commitment.
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Note that for all γ ∈ [0, 1],
v(., γ) = (1− γ)u(.) + γv(., 1).
Hence, for any γ > γ′, v(., γ′) is a convex combination of u and v(., γ). Therefore,
by Theorem 1.4.1, the preference represented by (u, v) satisfies Mixture-Increasing
Preference for Commitment.
Next, we calculate the utility of each menu involved in the motivating example.
It is easy to see that V (c) = 1
2
, V (f) = 0 and V ({αc+ (1− α)f}) = 1− α
2
. Consider
V ({c, f}). Notice that for all γ,





















=⇒ V ({c, f}) = 1
2
.
Thus, V ({c, f}) = 1
2
and
V ({c}) = V ({c, f}) > V ({f}).
Next, consider V ({αc+ (1− α)f ′, αf + (1− α)f ′}). Notice that for all γ,
u(αc+ (1− α)f ′) + v(αc+ (1− α)f ′, γ)
≥u(αf + (1− α)f ′) + v(αf + (1− α)f ′, γ).
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Hence,









































if and only if α > α2. Hence,
V ({αc+ (1− α)f ′}) > V ({αc+ (1− α)f ′, αf + (1− α)f ′}).
A.5 Proofs for Section 1.4
A.5.1 Proofs for Section 1.4.1
Proof of Proposition 1.4.1
Let (u, v, c) represent . Then, by Theorem 1 in Noor and Takeoka (2010),  satisfies
Commitment Independence and Set-Beteenness. Since general self-control models are
continuous, it is enough to show the result for finite menus. In what follows we will
use the following property of c (Noor and Takeoka (2010 p.134)):
4. c(p, v(p)) = 0 for all p ∈ ∆(X). For any menu z, let qz denote an arbitrary





Suppose  has preference for commitment at x but not at αx + (1− α)y. Then,
there exist px ∈ arg max
p∈x
u(p) and py ∈ arg max
p∈y
u(p) such that
c(αpx + (1− α)py, αv(qx) + (1− α)v(qy)) = 0.
Further, since  has preference for commitment at x, c(px, v(qx)) > 0 and u(px) >
u(qx). Hence, by Property 2, v(qx) > v(px). Therefore,
u(αpx + (1− α)py) > u(αqx + (1− α)qy)
and
v(αqx + (1− α)qy) > v(αpx + (1− α)py).
Thus, by Property 3, c(αpx + (1− α)py, αv(qx) + (1− α)v(qy)) > 0 a contradiction.
Part 2
Suppose  does not have preference for commitment at x and y but has preference
for commitment at αx + (1 − α)y. Then, there exist px ∈ arg max
p∈x
u(p) and py ∈
arg max
p∈y
u(p) such that c(px, v(qx)) = 0 and c(py, v(qy)) = 0. Since  has preference
for commitment at αx+ (1−α)y, then c(αpx + (1−α)py, αv(qx) + (1−α)v(qy)) > 0.
Hence, by Property 2, αv(qx) + (1 − α)v(qy) > αv(px) + (1 − α)v(py). Thus, either
v(qx) > v(px) or v(qy) > v(py). Since the proof that v(qy) > v(py) leads to a
contradiction is analogous to the proof that v(qx) > v(px) leads to a contradiction,
we only consider the case in which v(qx) > v(px).
By Property 2, v(qx) > v(px) implies u(qx) = u(px). Further, by Property 4,
αu(px) + (1 − α)u(py) > αu(qx) + (1 − α)u(qy). Hence, u(py) > u(qy). Therefore,
it must be the case that c(αqx + (1 − α)py, αv(qx) + (1 − α)v(py)) > 0. Thus, by
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Property 2,
αv(qx) + (1− α)v(py) > v(αqx + (1− α)py)
a contradiction.
A.5.2 Proofs for Section 1.4.2
For any γ ∈ (0, 1), define
Φ(x, γ) ≡ max
p∈x
{u(p, γ) + v(p, γ)−max
q∈x
v(q, γ)}
and let γ denote the preference over menus it represents.
Mixture Monotone Preference for Commitment without Commitment In-
dependence
Here we provide the counterparts of Theorems 1.4.1 and 1.4.2 for the case in which the
preference need not satisfy Commitment Independence under an additional assump-
tion. Each of this theorems involves a different additional assumption. The proof
for the case in which the preference satisfies Commitment Independence is almost
identical and does not require any of the additional assumptions. It only requires one
extra step which we provide at the end of the proof of the general case.
To state the theorems we require additional terminology. Let f, g, f ′, g : ∆(X)→
R. Say that (f, g) are a joint positive affine transformation of (f ′, g′) if there exists
a ∈ R++, bf , bg ∈ R such that f = af ′ + bf and g = ag′ + bg.
Theorem A.5.1. Assume  satisfies the axioms of Theorem 1.3.1, {p∗} ∼ {p∗, p∗}
and there exists p ∈ ∆(X) such that {p}  {p, p∗}. Then  satisfies Mixture-
Increasing Preference for Commitment if and only if there exists (u, v) that represents
 such that γ, γ′ ∈ (0, 1) and γ′ < γ implies that there exists a joint possitive affine
transformation of (u(., γ), v(., γ)) such that u(., γ) and v(., γ) are convex combinations
of u(., γ′) and v(., γ′).
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Theorem A.5.2. Assume  satisfies the axioms of Proposition 1.3.1, {p∗} ∼ {p∗, p∗}
and there exists q∗ ∈ ∆(X) such that {p∗}  {p∗, q}. Then  satisfies Mixture-
Decreasing Preference for Commitment if and only if there exists (u, v) that represents
 such that γ, γ′ ∈ (0, 1) and γ ∈ (0, 1) and γ, γ′ ∈ (0, 1), γ′ < γ implies that there
exists a joint positive affine transformation of (u(., γ′), v(., γ′)) such that u(., γ′) and
v(., γ) are convex combinations of u(., γ) and v(., γ).
The proof of Theorem A.5.1 is analogous to the proof of Theorem A.5.2. Thus,
we only show the proof of Theorem A.5.2.
Sufficiency
Let (u, v′) be the representation of  constructed using {p∗} and {p∗} as the best
and worst menus. Then, p = p∗ and p = p∗. By the uniqueness properties of (u, v
′)
there exists v such that (u, v) represents  and if v′(., γ) is a constant or a positive
affine transformation of u(., γ), then v(., γ) = u(., γ).
First we show that v(., γ) is not a negative affine transformation of u(., γ). By GP
(p. 1414) it is enough to show that for each γ ∈ (0, 1) either there exists y such that
{p} γ y γ {p′} for some p, p′ ∈ y.
To prove this, fix γ ∈ (0, 1) and note that since {p, p} ∼ {p}. By Lemma A.1.1,
there exists α ∈ (0, 1) such that
{αp+ (1− α)p, p} ∼ {γp+ (1− γ)p}.
Further, by Set-Betweenness
{αp+ (1− α)p}  {αp+ (1− α)p, p}  {p}.
Hence, by Lemma A.1.6,
Φ({αp+ (1− α)p}, γ) ≥ Φ({αp+ (1− α)p, p}, γ) = γ > 0 = Φ({p}, γ).
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Next, we show that if γ has preference for commitment at y and 1 > γ > γ′ > 0,
then γ′ also has preference for commitment at y.
There two possible cases: (i) V (y) ≥ γ. (ii) V (y) ≤ γ.
(i) V (y) ≥ γ
γ has preference for commitment at y implies  has preference for commit-
ment at λ(y, γ)y + (1 − λ(y, γ)){p}. Thus by Part I, and  has preference for
commitment at λ(y, γ′)y + (1− λ(y, γ′)){p}
(ii) V (y) ≤ γ
γ has preference for commitment at y implies has preference for commitment
at λ(y, γ)y+(1−λ(y, γ)){p}. Thus, by Part II  has preference for commitment
at λ(y, γ′)y+(1−λ(y, γ′)){p} if γ′ > V (y). If γ′ ≤ V (y), then by Part II,  has
preference for commitment at y, thus by Part I has preference for commitment
at λ(y, γ′)y + (1− λ(y, γ′)){p}
To conclude the proof, we need to apply Theorems 4 and 8 in GP. Hence, we need
to show that for all γ ∈ (0, 1), γ has preference for commitment at some menu. To
prove this, we use the assumption that there exists q such that {p}  {p, q}.
Assume towards a contradiction that there exists γ ∈ (0, 1) such that γ does
not have preference for commitment. By Continuity and Mixture-Betweenness, there
exists α such that
{p}  {p, αp+ (1− α)q}
and V ({p, αp+ (1− α)q}) > γ. By Lemma A.1.6, {p} V ({p,αp+(1−α)q}) {p, αp+ (1−
α)q}. Therefore V ({p,αp+(1−α)q}) has preference for commitment at {p, αp+(1−α)q}.
Hence, by the previous step, γ also has preference for commitment at {p, αp+ (1−
α)q}, a contradiction.
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Finally, if γ′ does not have preference for commitment at any y, then by con-
struction, v(., γ′) = u(., γ′). Then it must be the case that v(., γ) = u(., γ′), otherwise
there would exists y such that γ has preference for commitment at y and thus γ′
would also have preference for commitment at y so v(., γ′) 6= u(., γ′). Otherwise, by
Theorems 4 and 8 in Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), there exists a joint positive affine
transformation of (u(., γ), v(., γ)) such that u(., γ) is a convex combination of u(., γ′)
and v(., γ′), and v(., γ) is a convex combination of u(., γ′) and v(., γ′).1
Commitment Independence
First we show why under Commitment Independence the additional assumption is
not needed.
The additional assumption was used to rule out the case in which there exists
γ, γ′ ∈ (0, 1) such that γ > γ′, (u(., γ), v(, γ)) does not have preference for com-
mitment and (u(., γ′), v(, γ′)) has preference for commitment. Under Commitment
Independence, u(., γ′) = u(., γ) = u. By construction, u = v(., γ). Hence, v(., γ) = u.
Next, we provide the additional step needed to show that v(., γ) is a convex
combination of u and v(., γ′) for the case in which u 6= v(., γ).
Theorems 4 and 8 in Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) implies that u is a convex com-
bination of a joint positive affine transformation of u and v(., γ). However, if the
coefficient multiplying u of the joint affine transformation of (u, v(., γ)) is different
from 1, then v(., γ) is an affine transformation of u, a contradiction.
Necessity
The proof of necessity of Part 2 is analogous to the proof of Part 1. Hence, we only
show Part 1.
1Here we are citing the version of Theorem 8 in Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) stated in Gul and
Pesendorfer (2004).
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First note that by Theorem 8 in Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), the conditions in
the theorem imply that if 1 > γ > γ′ > 0 and γ has preference for commitment at
y, then γ′ also has preference for commitment at y. We will use this observation in
what follows.
Assume x  {p} and  has preference for commitment at αx+ (1−α){p}. Then
there exists px ∈ x such that {αpx + (1− α)p}  αx+ (1− α){p}. Thus, by Lemma
A.1.6, {αpx + (1− α)p} V (αx+(1−α){p}) αx+ (1− α){p}.
Hence, V (αx+(1−α){p}) has preference for commitment at αx + (1 − α){p}. Fur-
ther, since V (αx+(1−α){p}) satisfies Independence, V (αx+(1−α){p}) has preference for
commitment at x.
Fix 0 < β < α. By Lemma A.1.1, V (βx + (1 − β){p}) < V (αx + (1 − α){p}).
Hence, by the observation, V (βx+(1−β){p}) has preference for commitment at x. Thus,
by Independence, V (βx+(1−β){p}) has preference for commitment at βx+ (1− β){p}.
Hence, there exists p′x ∈ x such that {βp′x+(1−β)p} V (βx+(1−β){p}) βx+(1−β){p}.
Finally, by Lemma A.1.6, {βp′x + (1− β)p}  βx+ (1− β){p}. Therefore,  has
preference for commitment at βx+ (1− β){p}.
A.6 Sufficient Conditions on (u, v)
The following proposition provides sufficient conditions on (u, v) such that an implicit
representation as in Theorem 1.3.1 exists.
Proposition A.6.1. Let u, v : ∆(X)× [0, 1]→ R be such that u(., γ) and v(., γ) are
vNM utility functions for all γ ∈ [0, 1]. Then, the following are sufficient for (u, v) to
represent some preference .















{u(p, 0) + v(p, 0)−max
q∈x
v(q, 0)}
4. For all x ∈ X
φ(γ) = γ −max
p∈x
{u(p, γ) + v(p, γ)−max
q∈x
v(q, γ)}
is strictly increasing in [0, 1]
Proof. Notice that if for every x there exists a unique γ such that
γ = max
p∈x
{u(p, γ) + v(p, γ)−max
q∈x
v(q, γ)},
then 1 implies the utility function defined by the above equation is continuous. Hence,
we only need to show that for any x, the solution exists and it is unique. Define
Φ(x, γ) = max
p∈x
{u(p, γ) + v(p, γ)−max
q∈x
v(q, γ)}.
Then, condition (1) implies Φ(x, .) is continuous. Further, conditions 2 and 3 imply
Φ(x, 0) ≥ 0 and Φ(x, γ) ≤ 1. Thus, if Φ(x, 0) > 0 and Φ(x, γ) < 1, continuity implies
that a solution exists. Thus, to finish the proof we only need to show it is unique. To
see this, note that if Φ(x, γ) = γ, then φ(γ) = 0. Thus, by condition 4 φ(γ′) > 0 for
all γ′ > γ and φ(γ′) < 0 for all γ′′ < γ. Hence, the solution is unique.
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Appendix B
Appendices to Revealed Preference and
the Subjective State Space Hypothesis
B.1 Proofs for Section 2.3
B.1.1 Proof of Theorem 2.3.1
Necessity in each case is provided in the text. Here we prove sufficiency and the
assertion about the cardinality of the subjective state space.
Strategic Rationality





for all λ ∈ ∆(T ). Define C = {(p−q)|p =
∑
t λtpt, q ∈
∑
t λtdt and λ ∈ ∆(T )}. Then,
C is closed, convex and 0 6∈ C.
[Proof that C is convex. Take (p − q), (p′ − q′) ∈ C and α ∈ (0, 1). Then,
αp + (1 − α)p′ = α
∑






r(αλt + (1 − α)λ′t)pt. Hence, it
suffices to show that αq + (1 − α)q′ ∈
∑
t(αλt + (1 − α)λ′t)dt. By definition of C,
q =
∑







t. WLOG assume that @ t ∈ T such that λt = λ′t = 0.










t ∈ dt for all t ∈ T and∑
t(αλt+(1−α)λ′t)q′′t = αq+(1−α)q′. Hence, αq′+(1−α)q′ ∈
∑
t(αλt+(1−α)λ′t)dt]
By the Hyperplane Separation Theorem, there exists an expected utility function




















Hence, (c,B, T ) is rationalizable by a strategically rational representation.
Monotone Additive
Step 1: Find all the candidate expected utility functions.




t λtdt. Then, for every λ ∈ ∆(T )
there exists pλ =
∑





Define Cλ = {(pλ − q)|q ∈
∑
t λtdt}. Then, Cλ is closed and convex and 0 6∈ Cλ.
Hence, by the Hyperplane Separation Theorem, there exists an expected utility func-
tion uλ : ∆(X) → R and a real number κλ such that uλ(pλ) > κλ > uλ(q) for all
q ∈
∑
t λtdt. The set UΛ = {uλ|λ ∈ ∆(T )} contains all the expected utility functions
that are candidates for the representation.
Step 2: Choose a finite number of expected utility functions in UΛ to form the repre-
sentation.
Fix a λ ∈ ∆(T ) and let pλ =
∑
t λtpt,λ be the associated compund lottery described









We are going to show that there exists an ελ > 0 such that for all λ
′ ∈ Bελ(λ) ∩
∆(T ),






First note that for any λ′ ∈ ∆(T ) close enough to λ, uλ(pλ′,λ) > κλ. Define the




tdt. C is a compact-valued and
continuous correspondence. By the Maximum Theorem, for any λ′ close enough to




tdt. Hence, there exists ελ > 0 such that for for all





{Bελ|λ ∈ ∆(T )} forms an open cover of ∆(T ) which is compact. Hence, there
exists a finite sub cover Λ′1, ...,Λ
′
k. Define Λi = Λ
′
i ∩∆(T ). Note that ∪iΛi = ∆(T ).
Let ui be the expected utility function associated with Λ
′
i be the compound lottery




The u′is will be the expected utility functions in the additive representation.




uj(p) and ut,j = max
q∈dt
uj(q)
for t = 1, ..., T and j = 1, ..., k. According to the expected utility function uj, u
∗
t,j is
the utility of the best lottery in ct and ut,j is the utility of the best lottery in dt.
Let A = 
u∗11 − u11 u∗12 − u12 u∗13 − u13 . . . u∗1k − uik






u∗T1 − uT1 u∗T2 − uT2 u∗T3 − uT3 . . . u∗Tk − uTk

We claim that for any λ ∈ ∆(T ), Aᵀλ has a positive entry.1 To see this note that
any λ ∈ ∆(T ) must be in some Λi and by step 2, ui(pλ,λi) > u(q) for all q ∈
∑
t λtdt.












which implies that the ith entry of Aᵀλ is positive.
If there exists a µ > 0 such that Aµ > 0, then (c,B, T ) is rationalizable by a
monotone additive representation. Ville’s Theorem of the Alternative (Mangasarian
(2006)) characterizes the conditions under which such systems admit solutions.
Theorem B.1.1. Either
1. Ax > 0, x > 0 has a solution x,
2. Aᵀy ≤ 0, y ≥ 0, y 6= 0 has a solution y,
but never both.
It follows from above that Aᵀy has a positive entry for any y ≥ 0 and y 6= 0.
Hence, (c,B, T ) is rationalizable by a monotone additive representation.
Additive




t λtdt. Then, for every λ ∈ ∆(T ),





t λtdt. Then, there exists pλ =
∑
t λtpt,λ such that pt,λ ∈ ct




t λtdt. Define Cλ = {(pλ−q)|q ∈
∑
t λtdt}. Cλ is closed,
convex and 0 6∈ Cλ. By the Hyperplane Separation Theorem, there exists an expected












t λtct. Hence, there exists qλ =∑




t λtct. Define Cλ =
{(qλ − p)|p ∈
∑
t λtct}. Cλ is closed, convex and 0 6∈ Cλ. By the Hyperplane
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Separation Theorem, there exists an expected utility function uλ : ∆(X)→ R and a
number κλ such that uλ(qλ) > κλ > uλ(p) for all p ∈
∑
t λtct.
By an analogous argument to the one used in the proof of the monotone additive




















Define the A matrix as above. We claim that Aᵀλ has at least one non zero entry





















which implies that the ith entry if Aᵀλ is non zero.
If there exists a µ such that Aµ > 0, then (c,B, T ) is rationalizable by an ad-
ditive representation. Gordan’s Theorem of the Alternative (Mangasarian (2006))
characterizes the conditions under which such systems admits solutions.
Theorem B.1.2. Either
1. Ax > 0 has a solution x,
2. Aᵀy = 0, y ≥ 0, y 6= 0 has a solution y,
but never both.
It follows from above that Aᵀy has a non zero entry for any y ≥ 0 and y 6= 0.
Hence, (c,B, T ) is rationalizable by an additive representation.
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Bound on the cardinality of the state space
From above we can conclude that if a choice problem (c,B, T ) is rationalizable by
an (monotone) additive representation with an infinite state space, then it is also
rationalizable by an (monotone) additive representation with a finite state space.
Monotone Additive
Suppose (c,B, T ) is rationalizable by a monotone additive representation with a finite
state space of cardinality K > T . WLOG assume µ is strictly positive. Define the
A matrix as above. We are going to show that there exists a matrix A′ with r ≤ T
columns and a non-negative vector µ′ such that each column of A′ is a column of
A and A′µ′ > 0. Note that Aµ =
∑K
i=1 µiai where ai ∈ RT is the ith column of A.
Since µ > 0, then Aµ ∈ {
∑K
i=1 λiai|λi > 0 for every i}. Then, by the cone version
of Carathédory’s Theorem (Rockafellar (1970)), Aµ can be written as a non-negative
linear combination of T or fewer elements of {a1, ..., aK}. WLOG, assume that the
first r ≤ T elements of {a1, ..., aK} are the ones described by the theorem and let
α1, ..., αr ≥ 0 be the weights such that
∑r
i=1 αiai = Aµ > 0. To conclude the proof,
let A′ = [a1, ..., ar] and µ
′ be such that µ′i = αi. Hence, A
′µ′ > 0.
Additive
Suppose (c,B, T ) is rationalizable by an additive representation with a finite state
space of cardinality K > T . Define the A matrix as above. Then rank(A) = r ≤ T .
Hence, there are r linearly independent columns of A. WLOG assume a1, ..., ar are the
aforementioned columns. Let A′ = [a1, ..., ar], we are going to show that there exists




iai for every j ∈ {r+1, ..., K}
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i . Thus, A
′µ′ > 0.
B.1.2 Proof of Proposition 2.3.1
Let (c,B, T ) be such that ct = ch({δ1, ..., δT}) and dt = ch({δ1, ..., δt−1, δt+1, ..., δT})
where δi is the degenerate lottery that gives alternative xi with probability 1. Then,
by Theorem 2.3.1, (c,B, T ) is rationalizable by an additive representation. Assume,
by way of contradiction, that there exists an additive representation that rationalizes
(c,B, T ) with a state space of cardinality K < T . Assume the (signed) measure
associated with the representation is positive (hence the representation is monotone
additive). Then, by DLR’s Lemma 1, there exist p1, ..., pK such that pi ∈ {δ1, ..., δT}
and pi ∈ arg max
p∈ch({δ1,...,δT })
ui(p). Thus, there exists t ∈ T such that p1, ..., pK ∈ dt a
contradiction. Hence, it must be the case the (signed) measure corresponding to the
representation has at least one negative value.
Note that if the measure assigns negative values to all the states, then we get an im-
mediate contradiction. Hence, there exists at least one s such that µ(s) > 0. WLOG
assume the first r < K states are the ones with positive weight. By DLR’s Lemma 1



























B.2 Proof of Proposition 2.4.1
Part 2 follows from Propositions 1 and 3 in Gorno (2016). Here we prove Part 1.
Suppose (cK ,BK , T ) is rationalizable by a Kreps additive representation, then
there exists a finite set S and a state dependent utility function U : S ×X → R such











Let Ū : S×∆(X)→ R be such that Ūs(p) =
∑
x∈X p(x)Us(x). Then for every s ∈ S,
Ūs is an expected utility function. Let µ be a measure over S such that µ(s) = 1 for
every s ∈ S. Hence, (S, Ū , µ) forms a monotone additive representation, we will show
it rationalizes (c,B, T ). To see this, note that any preference over  over P (∆(X))
that has a monotone additive representation satisfies the following axiom: A ∼ ch(A)






































Next, suppose (c,B, T ) is rationalizable by a monotone additive representation. Then,
by Theorem 2.3.1, there exist a finite set S, a state dependent utility function U :












Assume WLOG that µ(s) = 1 for every s ∈ S. Let Ū : S × X → R be such that
Us(x) = Us(δx). Then, (S, Ū) forms a Kreps additive representation, we will show







































This appendix shows that, for the class of choice problems such that each menu
is either finite or finitely generated, the characterizing conditions in Theorem 2.3.1
can be reformulated as systems of nonlinear inequalities for which the existence of
solutions can be verified using existing numerical methods. Hence, the results in this
appendix provide a test for the representations which is implementable, at least in
principle. We focus on the case in which each menu is the convex hull of finitely many
lotteries; one can always replace a finite menu with its convex hull.
Fix a choice problem (c,B, T ) such that for all t ∈ T , Bt = {ct, dt} and
ct = ch({p1t , ..., pmct})
dt = ch({q1t , ..., qmdt })
where pit , qjt ∈ ∆(X) for every it ∈ {1, ...,mct}, j ∈ {1, ...,mdt } and mct ,mdt ∈ N.
Given T lotteries p1, ..., pT , let [p1, ..., pT ] denote the matrix that has lottery pt in
column t. Define C = {C ∈ Rn×T |C = [p1, ..., pT ], pt ∈ {p1t , ..., pmct} ∀t ∈ T} and
D = {D ∈ Rn×T |D = [q1, ..., qT ], qt ∈ {q1t , ..., qmdt } ∀t ∈ T}. Since {p1t , ..., pmct} and
{q1t , ..., qmdt } are finite for all t ∈ T , C and D are finite sets. Hence
C = {C1, ..., Ckc}











Before moving on to the systems of inequalities we state and prove a lemma we
use in the proofs of the following results.
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λtqt|qt ∈ {q1t , ..., qmdt }∀t ∈ T})
Proof. Follows from the following fact (Schneider (2014)): Let A = ch({x1, ..., xn})
and B = ch({y1, ..., ym}) be two Rn-polytopes and let C = A + B where the sum is
in Minkowski sense. Then
C = ch({x+ y|x ∈ {x1, ..., xn}, y ∈ {y1, ..., ym}}).
B.3.1 Strategically Rational
Proposition B.3.1. (c,B, T ) is rationalizable by a strategically rational represen-







αi = 1, αi ≥ 0∑
t
λt = 1, λt ≥ 0.
Proof. First note that by Lemma 1 in DLR and Theorem 2.3.1, (c,B, T ) is rationaliz-
able by a strategically rational representation if and only if there exist p1, ..., pT such




t λtdt ∀ λ ∈ ∆(T ).
Hence, by Lemma B.3.1, (c,B, T ) is rationalizable by a strategically rational rep-
resentation if and only if there exist p1, ...pT such that pt ∈ {p1t , ..., pmct} ∀ t ∈ T and∑
t λtpt 6∈ ch({
∑
t λqt|qt ∈ {q1t , ..., qmdt }∀t ∈ T}) ∀ λ ∈ ∆(T ).
Note that for any p1, ..., pT such that pt ∈ {p1t , ..., pmct} ∀t ∈ T there exists a j ∈
{1, ..., kc} such that Cj = [p1, ..., pT ] and
∑
t λtpt = Cjλ. Moreover, ch({
∑
t λtqt|qt ∈
{q1t , ..., qmdt }∀t ∈ T}) = ch({D1λ, ..., Dkdλ}). Hence, (c,B, T ) is rationalizable by a
strategically rational representation if and only if for some j ∈ {1, ..., kc}, there does
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not exists a λ ∈ ∆(T ) such that Cjλ ∈ ch({D1λ, ..., Dkdλ}) which is equivalent to
requiring the above system to not have a solution for some j ∈ {1, ..., kc}.
B.3.2 Monotone Additive
Proposition B.3.2. (c,B, T ) is rationalizable by a monotone additive representation
if and only if the following system does not have a solution
kd∑
i=1




αi,j = 1 for j = 1, ..., k
c
αi,j ≥ 0 for i = 1, ..., kd and j = 1, ..., kc∑
t
λt = 1, λt ≥ 0.




t λtdt if and
only if {
∑
t λtpt|pt ∈ {p1t , ..., pmct}∀t ∈ T} ⊆ ch({
∑
t λtqt|qt ∈ {q1t , ..., qmdt }∀t ∈ T}).
Moreover, {
∑
t λtpt|pt ∈ {p1t , ..., pmct}∀t ∈ T} = {C1λ, ..., Ckcλ} and ch({
∑
t λtqt|qt ∈
{q1t , ..., qmdt }∀t ∈ T}) = ch({D1λ, ..., Dkdλ}). Hence, by Theorem 2.3.1, (c,B, T )
is rationalizable by a monotone additive representation if and only if there does not
exists a λ ∈ ∆(T ) such that {C1λ, ..., Ckcλ} ⊆ ch({D1λ, ..., Dkdλ}) which is equivalent
to requiring the above system to not have a solution.
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B.3.3 Additive
Proposition B.3.3. (c,B, T ) is rationalizable by an additive representation if and



















αci,j = 1 for j = 1, ..., k
d
αdi,j ≥ 0 for i = 1, ..., kd and j = 1, ..., kc
αci,j ≥ 0 for i = 1, ..., kc and j = 1, ..., kd∑
t
λt = 1, λt ≥ 0.









λtpt|pt ∈ {p1t , ..., pmct}∀t ∈ T} ⊆ ch({
∑
t




λtqt|qt ∈ {q1t , ..., qmdt }∀t ∈ T} ⊆ ch({
∑
t
λtpt|pt ∈ {p1t , ..., pmct}∀t ∈ T}).
Since {
∑
t λtpt|pt ∈ {p1t , ..., pmct}∀t ∈ T} = {C1λ, ..., Ckcλ} and
{
∑
t λtqt|qt ∈ {q1t , ..., qmdt }∀t ∈ T} = {D1λ, ..., Dkdλ}, it is enough to check whether





t λtdt. Hence, by Theorem 2.3.1, (c,B, T ) is rationalizable by an
additive representation if and only if there does not exists a λ ∈ ∆(T ) such that
{C1λ, ..., Ckcλ} ⊆ ch({D1λ, ..., Dkdλ}) and {D1λ, ..., Dkdλ} ⊆ ch({C1λ, ..., Ckcλ})
which is equivalent to requiring the above system to not have a solution.
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B.3.4 Solving the Inequalities
In this section we describe the numerical methods that can be used to check if the
above systems have solutions. We restrict our attention to the monotone additive
case; the strategically rational and additive cases are handled in an analogous way.






αi,j = 1, αi,j ≥ 0 for i = 1, ..., kd and j = 1, ..., kc∑
t
λt = 1, λt ≥ 0.
Let Fj : RT+k
c×kd → Rn be such that Fj(λ, α) =
∑kd
i=1(Diλ)αi,j−Cjλ for j = 1, ..., kc.
Then, Fj is twice continuously differentiable and has analytic derivatives. Let F :
RT+kc×kd → Rkc×n be such that







Hence, the above system is equivalent to
F (λ, α) = 0,
kd∑
i=1
αi,j = 1, αi,j ≥ 0 for i = 1, ..., kd and j = 1, ..., kc∑
t
λt = 1, λt ≥ 0.









αi,j = 1, αi,j ≥ 0 for i = 1, ..., kd and j = 1, ..., kc∑
t
λt = 1, λt ≥ 0.
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where ‖.‖ is the euclidean norm. Then, the system of nonlinear equations has a so-
lution if and only if the global minimum of the optimization problem is equal to 0.
The above optimization problem can be solved using numerical methods like New-
ton’s, augmented Lagrangian function, sequential quadratic programming (SQP),
trust-region SQP or the interior point method. For a comprehensive textbook re-
view of relevant numerical methods see Nocedal and Wright (2006). For more recent
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